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HOLACRACY AND THE LAW
MATTHEW T. BODIE*
ABSTRACT
No law requires companies to have CEOs, officers, supervisors,
chains of command, or even employees. But traditional managerial
structures are so ingrained in our political economy that legal doctrines
take them for granted. What if they were to disappear? Under holacracy,
a new version of participatory management adopted at companies like
Zappos and Medium, companies are replacing managers, organizational
charts, and subordinates with governance circles, roles, and lead links.
The promise of holacracy is a system of management that devolves
responsibilities to teams, empowers workers to act freely within specified
zones of authority, and energizes the entire organization around an
evolutionary purpose. This Article takes holacracy’s fully imagined
approach and asks how current law would respond. Looking at corporate
law, fiduciary law, labor and employment law, contract law, and criminal
law, the Article breaks down the legal and economic assumptions about
traditional firm hierarchies and then contemplates how we can reconceive
existing law and policy to match the purposes of holacracy and its kin.
Ultimately, holacracy teaches us not only about the possibilities of
participatory governance, but also the extent to which we assume that
hierarchy goes hand-in-hand with business entities.
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INTRODUCTION
Ever since the development of the modern corporation, the law has
assumed a hierarchical approach to internal corporate governance.
Corporations are ruled by a board of directors that sits atop the hierarchy.1
The board delegates governance responsibilities to a set of officers, who
then control the actual workings of the corporation.2 The chief executive
officer has ultimate managerial power, with other officers below, and then
executives, managers, and the mass of workers known simply as
1

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2016); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01 (2016).
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 142(a) (2016) (“Every corporation organized under
this chapter shall have such officers with such titles and duties as shall be stated in the bylaws
or in a resolution of the board of directors which is not inconsistent with the bylaws . . . .”).
2
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employees. This executive structure plays an especially important role in
corporate law, as officers owe important duties to the board and the
corporation itself.3 But the structure shapes the doctrine in other areas of
law as well, such as securities regulation, labor and employment law,
contract law, and criminal law. Most fundamentally, the corporate
managerial hierarchy informs our legal and societal perspective on the
nature of the organization itself.
Participatory management is a common term for those managerial
methodologies that endeavor to flatten or shift the power relations within
the traditional corporate pyramid. These efforts have waxed and waned
over time, with a previous boom in activity in the 1990s.4 In an important
recent trend, however, companies are rediscovering participatory
management within a broader explosion of concern for corporate social
responsibility and human flourishing.5 These approaches do not fall
within the established alternatives such as employee-owned companies,
consumer cooperatives, or non-profits. Instead, they are for-profit
companies, organized as corporations, partnerships, or LLCs, that have
radically restructured the internal hierarchy. These efforts have been
accorded various labels, such as “self-managed,” “self-actualizing,”
“evolutionary,” “integral,” “flat,” and even “teal.”6 They represent a
movement seeking an economics of fairness, innovation, and
sustainability as well as efficiency.
One particular instantiation of this broader movement is a system
known as “holacracy.”7 Holacracy is a comprehensively designed internal
3
Deborah A. DeMott, Corporate Officers as Agents, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 847, 848
(2017) (discussing the “distinctive” and “crucial” roles that officers play within the corporation,
including as a fiduciary).
4
For a detailed discussion of these approaches, see Stephen M. Bainbridge,
Participatory Management Within a Theory of the Firm, 21 J. CORP. L. 657, 658–59 (1996);
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Privately Ordered Participatory Management: An Organizational
Failures Analysis, 23 DEL. J. CORP. L. 979, 981–82 (1998).
5
For examples of this broader literature, see COLIN MAYER, FIRM COMMITMENT: WHY
THE CORPORATION IS FAILING US AND HOW TO RESTORE TRUST IN IT 8-9 (2013); RAJ SISODIA,
JAG SHETH & DAVID WOLFE, FIRMS OF ENDEARMENT: HOW WORLD-CLASS COMPANIES
PROFIT FROM PASSION AND PURPOSE (2014).
6
FREDERIC LALOUX, REINVENTING ORGANIZATIONS: A GUIDE TO CREATING
ORGANIZATIONS INSPIRED BY THE NEXT STAGE OF HUMAN CONSCIOUSNESS 43 (2014) (using
“self-actualizing,” “evolutionary,” “integral,” and “teal”); Ethan Bernstein et al., Beyond the
Holacracy Hype, HARV. BUS. REV. 38, 40 (2016) (using “self-managed” and “flat”). The “teal”
label refers to the color system used by integral theory to designate various stages of human
development. See, e.g., KEN WILBER, INTEGRAL PSYCHOLOGY: CONSCIOUSNESS, SPIRIT,
PSYCHOLOGY, THERAPY (2000); KEN WILBER, A BRIEF HISTORY OF EVERYTHING 27–30
(1996); JENNY WADE, CHANGES OF MIND: A HOLONOMIC THEORY OF THE EVOLUTION OF
CONSCIOUSNESS (1996).
7
See, e.g., BRIAN J. ROBERTSON, HOLACRACY: THE NEW MANAGEMENT SYSTEM FOR
A RAPIDLY CHANGING WORLD 12–14 (2015); Bernstein et al., supra note 6.
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management system that has received significant attention for its adoption
at Zappos, Medium, and other tech companies.8 Holacracy replaces the
internal firm hierarchy with a governance process that looks, in many
ways, like a constitutional democracy. However, holacracy has a
nomenclature all its own. CEOs hand over their power to a system of
governance “circles”—teams that are assigned specific management
responsibilities.9 These teams have the power to design and refine
corporate policy within their jurisdictions. There is no overarching
hierarchy to make ultimate decisions or overrule teams; instead, there is
generally one ultimate governance circle—representing the entire
organization—that has the final authority.10 The circles manage the
assignment of roles to workers and oversee their performance.11
Ultimately, holacracy is a combination of democratic republic, Quaker
meetinghouse, and tech-speak: the system is structured to encourage
participation by all employees in governance through a carefully designed
set of roles and opportunities.12
Holacracy has received attention in the national media, popular
managerial literature, and business school scholarship.13 But the
phenomenon of integral managerial systems, such as holacracy, has
important ramifications for the law of business governance. Much of the
law surrounding the firm—corporate law, agency law, labor and
employment law, contract law, and even criminal law—assumes the
existence of the internal hierarchy in its operations and processes. If that
hierarchy is taken away, the law no longer fits neatly into place. Instead,
we have to rethink our assumptions about the structure of the business firm
and transform the law in order to make it fit. In this respect, the holacracy
model is a useful tool for reexamining and reevaluating our current legal
8
Bernstein et al., supra note 6, at 40; see also Roger D. Hodge, First, Let’s Get Rid of
All the Bosses, NEW REPUBLIC (Oct. 4, 2015), https://newrepublic.com/article/122965/canbillion-dollar-corporation-zappos-be-self-organized; Bourree Lam, Why Are So Many Zappos
Employees
Leaving?,
ATLANTIC
(Jan.
15,
2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/01/zappos-holacracy-hierarchy/424173/.
9
ROBERTSON, supra note 7, at 46–49.
10
Id. at 46.
11
One such set of roles, known as “links,” connect the circles to one another and provide
a leadership role within the circle. Id. at 49–55.
12
Id. at 12.
13
See, e.g., Bernstein et al., supra note 6, at 42; Hodge, supra note 8. Much of the
business press has been strongly negative on holacracy, viewing as utopian and too focused on
interaction (as opposed to action). See Jurgen Appelo, Holacracy is Fundamentally Broken,
FORBES (July 14, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jurgenappelo/2016/07/14/holacracy-isfundamentally-broken/#1731f5201126; Paul Bradley Carr, A Holacracy of Dunces, PANDO
(July 3, 2015), https://pando.com/2015/07/03/holacracy-dunces/; Lam, supra note 8; Felix
Velarde, Is Holacracy Finally Dead?, QUARTZ (May 16, 2016), https://qz.com/677130/isholacracy-finally-dead/.
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systems. Even if holacracy is only a blip in organizational theory, it can
nevertheless help us better understand how dependent we have become on
assumptions of internal hierarchical governance. We can learn more about
the role of hierarchy in our current political economy by examining how
the law might react and adapt to this much flatter system of governance.
Part I provides an overview of the holacracy system, both in theory
and in practice. Part II examines holacracy’s effect on our thinking about
organization identity and purpose. Part III discusses the effect of
holacracy on firm management, looking particularly at the roles of
directors and officers. In Part IV, the paradigms of labor and employment
law doctrines, particularly the labor-management divide, are contrasted
with the reenvisioned holacratic workplace. Finally, Part V reconsiders
the law of entity responsibility, particularly criminal liability, for the
holacratic firm.
I. THE HOLACRACY SYSTEM
Systems of participatory management have a long, if limited,
history, both in the United States and abroad.14 A similarly limited but
robust academic literature has examined the strengths and weaknesses of
various permutations of the approach.15 This Article is not a normative
evaluation of participatory management generally or holacracy
specifically. It is instead an effort to understand the particular system of
holacracy and the ways in which holacracy would interact with legal
doctrine. It therefore makes sense to begin by placing holacracy within
the realm of management methods that undo hierarchies and involve
workers in governance.
A. Holacracy as a System of Participatory Governance
Holacracy is only one of a set of relatively recent management
systems that are designed to transform business hierarchies into flatter,

14
The last significant bloom of participatory management within firms occurred in the
1980s and 1990s. See Bainbridge, supra note 4, at 673 (“Over the last two decades, however,
participatory management has emerged as the principal putative challenger to traditional
corporate hierarchies.”). However, efforts to integrate employees into the governance of the
firm are long-standing. See, e.g., Clyde Summers, Codetermination in the United States: A
Projection of Problems and Potentials, 4 COMP. L. CORP. L. & SEC. REG. 155, 170 (1982).
15
See Bainbridge, supra note 4, at 986–90 (providing a taxonomy). See also
HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON EMPLOYEE VOICE (Adrian Wilkinson et al. eds., 2014); Marleen
A. O'Connor, The Human Capital Era: Reconceptualizing Corporate Law to Facilitate LaborManagement Cooperation, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 899, 901 (1993).
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team-oriented, constitutional structures.16 These organizational forms
have often been pursued in isolation from one another but share a set of
common characteristics.17 First, these organizations place much more
importance on their collective purpose. Unlike U.S. corporations, which
generally have dropped any meaningful description of corporate purpose
from their founding charters, these businesses see their mission statements
as relevant to every decision that the company makes. Second, these
businesses enact systems of internal self-management, rather than
hierarchical governance, when it comes to firm management.
Traditionally-managed firms have a strict chain of command from CEO to
vice-presidents to managers and so on down to the line worker, but selfmanaged companies devolve much more power to the team level. And
transformational decisions, such as mergers, new products, or supply
chains, are subject to much greater input from the organization as a whole
through the company’s shared-governance approach. Finally, these
companies generally have decision-making processes that are designed to
engender conflict but then resolve it. Choices are made not based on
hierarchical positions or even majority vote, but rather on a set of
processes through which the issue is framed, discussed, and then resolved.
The management literature has surfaced various examples of these
types of companies—some of which have delved more deeply into various
aspects of the overall prototype. The Dutch firm Buurtzorg, for example,
provides neighborhood nursing care through a system of nursing teams
that are largely self-managed within the overall organization (with
currently around 7,000 nurses).18 The company has received worldwide
attention for its “complete care” approach to nursing that allows more time
to spend with each patient on a variety of issues.19 Along with this
organizational purpose, Buurtzorg’s governance model consists almost
entirely of teams of ten to twelve nurses. These teams are hierarchically
flat, with no supervisor or “boss” to coordinate within the group and only
thin organizational support for issues that might arise outside of the team’s
16
ROBERTSON, supra note 7, at 203 (“Holacracy is just one example of a system that
uses peer-to-peer self-organization and distributed control in lieu of more traditional approaches
to achieving order.”); Ben Linders, Adding Purpose to Scrum with Holacracy, INFOQ (Jan. 9,
2017), https://www.infoq.com/articles/purpose-scrum-holacracy (“With Holacracy, the whole
system is created to make your organisation Teal.”).
17
LALOUX, supra note 6, at 7.
18
Id. at 65.
19
See, e.g., Adam Brimelow, Dutch District Nurses Rediscover “Complete Care” Role,
BBC (May 27, 2013), http://www.bbc.com/news/health-22450482; The Commonwealth Fund,
Home Care by Self-Governing Nursing Teams: The Netherlands' Buurtzorg Model (May 29,
2015),
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/case-studies/2015/may/home-carenursing-teams-netherlands.
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expertise.20 The nurses are extensively trained in the Buurtzorg approach
to self-management, which provides a set of skills and processes for
resolving the myriad issues that arise within the teams. 21 The French
manufacturing firm FAVI employs over 400 people making automobile
gearbox forks and other brass and copper components.22 Like Buurtzorg,
FAVI relies on teams of manufacturing workers to manage their own work
with little middle management or support structure.23 Coordination across
teams is accomplished by the teams themselves, working together through
group representatives to resolve issues, make budgets, and create
temporary teams to handle more complicated difficulties.24 And Morning
Star—the West Coast tomato processor, not the investment firm—
produces over forty percent of the tomato paste and diced tomatoes in the
United States through a system of twenty-three horizontal teams.25 Each
worker—known as a “colleague”—annually writes a personal mission
statement that defines the roles that the worker will take on in the
upcoming year.26 The workers then negotiate with coworkers over these
roles one-on-one and receive a set of approvals for their proposed
positions.27
These illustrations demonstrate the commonalities between these
various organizations that have all made commitments of some kind to a
self-managed or integral model of management. Holacracy is different,
however, in that it is not simply a set of common features between
organizations; it is instead an organizational operating model that exists
apart from any one company.28 Holacracy is practiced by Holacracy One,
the consulting firm that promotes the use of the holacracy system, as well

20

LALOUX, supra note 6, at 67.
Id. (describing the approach, which includes a training course entitled “SolutionDriven Methods of Interaction”).
22
Id. at 73–74; Patrick Gilbert et al., Work Organization and Innovation – Case Study:
FAVI,
France
1
(2013),
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1253&context=intl.
23
Gilbert et al., supra note 22, at 14 (“FAVI has produced a kind of distillation of many
of the most recent organisational innovations: the flattening of structures, making employees
more responsible, the client-focus approach, the calling into question of the usefulness of
procedures, and the effort to ensure that the decision-making process is as close as possible to
the action.”)
24
LALOUX, supra note 6, at 75–78.
25
Id. at 113. See also Leigh Buchanan, One Company's Audacious Org Chart: 400
Leaders, 0 Bosses, INC (Apr. 18, 2013), https://www.inc.com/audacious-companies/leighbuchanan/morning-star.html (calling the organization “flatter than a pancake leveled by a
steamroller”); Gary Hamel, First, Let’s Fire All the Managers, HARV. BUS. REV. (Dec. 2011),
https://hbr.org/2011/12/first-lets-fire-all-the-managers.
26
LALOUX, supra note 6, at 115.
27
Id. at 116–17.
28
Id. at 117.
21
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as other companies such as Zappos and Valve.29 But it is not simply a
catalogue of the practices at those companies; it exists independently as a
fully-described system. The structure of Holacracy is laid out in the
Holacracy Constitution, which provides the core rules, structure, and
processes of the Holacracy operating system for companies.30 It is further
developed in the book on holacracy, authored by Brian Robertson, who is
primarily responsible for designing the system.31 And Holacracy One has
its own operating agreement available to the public, which provides more
detail as to some of the legal organizational issues.32 These sources offer
a deeper perspective into the functioning of this particular version of
integral or self-managed (or teal) organizations.33
Unlike other management programs that focus on what managers
do, holacracy is a radical reinvention of the corporate structure. The
holacracy approach centers on three main organizational reforms: first, a
complex internal governance structure that distributes power to
nonhierarchical groups; second, processes for raising and resolving issues
within the governance structure; and, third, a focus on purpose.34
Although pieces of the holacracy system can be adopted, the architects of
the system warn against it.35 However, there are choices to be made within
the overall framework, and a variety of different organizations can
implement holacracy with appropriate tailoring. Even a division or
department inside a larger organization that follows a traditional structure
can adopt holacracy.

29

Bernstein et al., supra note 6, at 43.
HOLACRACY CONST., http://www.holacracy.org/constitution (on version 4.1 as of this
writing); see also Bernstein et al., supra note 6, at 43 (describing holacracy as “the best-known
and the most fully specified” of the various systems of self-managed teams).
31
ROBERTSON, supra note 7.
32
Operating Agreement of Holacracy One, LLC (June 19, 2015),
https://tinyurl.com/yddk9zn3 [hereinafter Holacracy One Operating Agreement].
33
In addition, I also conducted an interview with Brian Robertson, who was extremely
helpful in providing additional insight into the workings of holacracy in practice. Interview with
Brian J. Robertson, author (Mar. 16, 2017) (notes on file with author) [hereinafter Robertson
Interview].
34
Robertson describes holacracy as “a new social technology for governing and
operating an organization, defined by a set of core rules distinctly different from those of a
conventionally governed organization.” ROBERTSON, supra note 7, at 12. He notes that
holacracy includes the following elements: “a constitution, which sets out the ‘rules of the game’
and redistributes authority[;] a new way to structure an organization and define people’s roles
and spheres of authority within it[;] a unique decision-making process for updating those roles
and authorities[; and] a meeting process for keeping teams in sync and getting work done
together.” Id.
35
Id. at 174 (describing holacracy as “one whole interwoven system”). Robertson does
describe steps that organizations can take to move toward and prepare for holacracy. Id. at 176–
83.
30
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B. The Holacracy Approach
Participatory management systems generally restructure an
organization’s internal governance to eliminate hierarchical lines of
authority and replace them with team- or group-oriented governance
systems. Holacracy follows this general approach. However, through the
work of Brian Robertson and his fellow partners at Holacracy One, LLC,
a more fully realized and comprehensive system has been developed than
these participatory governance structures that have been adopted
piecemeal by individual firms. What follows is an overview of the most
important pieces of the holacracy approach: the constitutional structure,
the governance processes, and the organizational purpose.
1. Constitutional Structure
Holacracy is grounded in a complex system of governance that
controls the internal dynamics of the firm. Like a state constitution, the
Holacracy Constitution—or the particular variant of it adopted by a
particular firm—is meant to be the controlling governance document.36 As
described by Robertson in Holacracy, the constitution is the “core
rulebook for the organization” whose “rules and processes reign supreme,
and trump even the person who adopted it.”37 By adopting a constitution,
the CEO and/or other firm leader(s) hand over their organizational power
to the processes described therein. The model constitution has a signature
page in which the ratifiers—presumably the CEO or the like—agree to
adopt the constitution and “thereby cede their authority into the
Constitution’s processes and endow the due results therefrom with the
weight and authority otherwise carried by the ratifier(s).”38 The legal
status of the adoption depends on what legal steps are taken to ratify it.
For example, a signature by the CEO will not ultimately bind a corporate
board or even the CEO that signed it. However, if a corporation adopts
the constitution through its legal bylaws or corporate charter, then it could
only be amended by the processes established under state organizational

36

The Model Constitution describes itself as “the core rules, structure, and processes of
the Holacracy ‘operating system’ for governing and managing an organization. It provides the
foundation for an organization wishing to use Holacracy, by anchoring the shift of power
required in concrete and documented ‘rules of the game’, which everyone involved can rely
upon.” HOLACRACY CONST., Intro.
37
ROBERTSON, supra note 7, at 21.
38
HOLACRACY CONST., append. A (Constitution Adoption Declaration).
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law for amending said bylaws or charter.39 The Holacracy One, LLC
Operating Agreement explicitly adopts the holacracy constitution.40
Although using the term “constitution” to refer to its foundational
document, the holacracy governance system does not follow traditional
notions of constitutional democracy in its structure. Robertson likens
holacracy to the human body, in terms of one overall organizational “unit”
that contains many internal operating systems all working independently
but together.41 The holacracy system carries this metaphor forward but
with its own terminology for its structures and processes. Within the
company, governance is operationalized through a system of “circles.”
The circles represent both an area of authority—known as a “domain”—
and the roles and accountabilities that operate within that authority. The
holacracy system is essentially a series of nested and parallel circles that
organize the internal processes of the company; these circles are the
governance structure for the organizations. Although called a variety of
names in self-managed companies,42 these structures are essentially teams:
units of workers collected around a specific goal or purpose.43
The outermost holacracy circle, which represents the purposes of
the entire organization, is called the “anchor circle.”44 Upon the adoption
of the constitution, the anchor circle establishes all of the other circles
within the organization.45 The circles are built to have a specific purpose,
an established domain of authority, and accountabilities for which they are
responsible.46 These three aspects are not just for show; they form the
governance structure. Each circle has control over its own domains and
39
Amending a corporation’s articles of incorporation is generally a three-step process:
the board of directors must recommend the amendment to the shareholders; the shareholders
must approve the amendment; and the amendment must be filed with the secretary of state for
the state of incorporation. See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW 14–15 (2d. ed.
2009) (bylaws can typically be amended only by shareholders, although the modern trend is to
allow shareholders or the board of directors to amend); HOLACRACY CONST., Intro. (cautioning
that the constitution is “not a complete set of legal bylaws or a formal operating agreement”).
40
Holacracy One Operating Agreement, supra note 32, § 3.1, at 7 (“The management
and control of the Company and of its business, the power to act for and bind the Company, and
all matters and questions of policy and management shall be vested exclusively in the due
process defined in the Constitution, and any decisions to be made in connection with the conduct
of the business of the Company shall be made by the Managers so authorized in the manner
provided therein.”).
41
ROBERTSON, supra note 7, at 17, 38.
42
Bernstein et al., supra note 6, at 7 (noting that the terms “pods” is used to describe
teams in a self-managed organization).
43
Id. (“Whatever they’re called, these basic components . . . are the essential building
blocks of their organizations.”).
44
ROBERTSON, supra note 7, at 46; HOLACRACY CONST., art. V, § 2.
45
ROBERTSON, supra note 7, at 154–55.
46
Id. at 48.
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can veto any actions in those domains by those outside of the circle.
Holacracy works not simply as a large constitutional democracy but rather
more like a federalized system of authority in which the smaller units have
almost complete authority within their jurisdictions.
The same is true for “roles,” which are the smallest unit of
governance within holacracy. In some ways, roles and circles are the
same: both have defined purposes, explicit domains, and expected
accountabilities.47 However, a role is a sub-unit of a circle and is
performed by a company worker. Roles are given specific names and
defined when they are created. The role’s domain is exclusive to that role
(or set of roles) and provides the role-filler with exclusive authority within
that domain.48 Accountability is the flip side of the domain: the role is
expected to produce the results that its domain empowers it to pursue.49
So, to pick a trivial example, if the role is “coffee maker,” the role has
domain over the coffee maker but is expected to make the coffee as
specified within the role’s accountabilities.
Circles are made up of the roles necessary to pursue the purpose and
accountabilities of a particular circle. However, holacracy also includes
five additional governance roles within the circles. First, the “lead link”
is the link between the circle itself and the broader circle that exists outside
of it.50 The lead link is the connection that insures that the circle is
pursuing the purpose for which it was established.51 The lead link looks,
in some ways, like a traditional manager or supervisor, in that the lead link
generally sets priorities for the circle and assigns workers to their
individual roles.52 However, once the role has been delegated, the lead link
has no authority to override the decisions made within the role. If the lead
link presents a role with a particular task, the role-filler can turn it down if
it is outside the role’s accountabilities. Or the role-filler can fulfill the
ultimate aim of the assignment in a different way. Each individual role
retains control over its tasks, and lead links cannot demand that the work
be done in a particular way or by a particular person simply on their own
authority. Even the lead link in the anchor circle—the closest comparison
to a CEO—cannot demand that another role do something in a particular
47

Id. at 44; see also HOLACRACY CONST., art. I, § 1.
ROBERTSON, supra note 7, at 44 (“A domain (of which there may be several) specifies
something the role has the exclusive authority to control on behalf of the organization—in other
words, this role’s ‘property.’”).
49
Id.
50
Id. at 49 (“The ‘Lead Link’ is appointed by the super-circle to represent its needs in
the sub-circle.”).
51
Id. (“A lead link holds the perspective and functions needed to align the sub-circle
with the purpose, strategy, and needs of its broader context.”).
52
Id. at 52, 57; see also HOLACRACY CONST., art. II, § 2.1.
48
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way.53 The constitution holds power within the organization and provides
roles with a significant amount of autonomous authority.
A second governance role is that of the representative link, or “rep
link.”54 If the lead link represents the outer organization within the circle,
the rep link connects the concerns of the circle to the outer organization.
The rep link is elected by the members of the circle and participates in the
governance of the outer circle. The rep link is supposed to be a true
representative of the interests of the circle as well as a messenger regarding
problems within the circle that need outside help to resolve.55 On rare
occasions, a third governance role known as a “cross link” will be created
to connect sub-circles within a broader circle.56 These roles are created
only for ad hoc issues that arise between two sub-circles that are best
addressed outside of the normal governance structure. The fourth and fifth
roles are also roles elected within the circle: the “facilitator” and the
“secretary.”57 The facilitator runs the circle’s governance meetings, and
the secretary administers those meetings by scheduling them and keeping
all required records.58
As the foregoing discussion shows, holacracy is not a shapeless,
flat agglomeration of equally empowered participants. Instead, holacracy
seeks to create significantly more structure than the traditional governance
system and then populate that structure with empowered participants.
Rather than using a hierarchical organizational tree, holacracy is a system
of roles and circles that define the purpose of the organization and its
subparts, the jurisdictional authority of each part, and the expected results
that each part is designed to pursue and attain. The hierarchy is “flatter”
in that each worker has control of her role’s domains and cannot be ordered
to perform the role’s accountabilities in a particular way. However, the
lead links act in similar ways to managers or supervisors, and the circles
are organized so that important, firm-wide decisions are made by the
anchor circle, in which only a select group of rep links and roles
participate.59
We know that holacracy is meant to replace the “CEO and below”
traditional organizational approach—but what about the board of
directors? The holacracy model is ambivalent about the board. When an
existing organization adopts the holacracy approach, Robertson
53
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recommends that it be adopted via the CEO, without official board action,
because of the “extra complexity of getting board-level buy-in up front.”60
In such a situation, the board exists outside of holacracy—outside of the
anchor circle—and retains ultimate control over the corporation.
However, holacracy is also open to bringing the board into the system as
the anchor circle, at which point the CEO becomes the lead link to a
general company circle.61 The board/anchor circle is not required to have
a lead link; instead, the board uses the holacracy decision-making process
to run the board.62 (A facilitator and secretary would still be required.) In
such cases, Robertson suggests that each director become a cross-link with
one of the general company sub-circles.63 All directors could become
cross-links to the investor sub-circle, which would make these directors
similar to the directors in a traditional for-profit company.64 Alternatively,
they could each link up with a different sub-circle, in the manner of
stakeholder directors: one could link with key vendors, another with
customers, a third with employees, and so on. This second possibility
would be speculative, Robertson acknowledges, as it has not been tried on
any scale.65 Moreover, it would put investors in a more precarious
position.66 On the other hand, investors are already differently positioned
within holacracy, as the focus of the organization is on its purpose and not
on shareholder wealth maximization. In Robertson’s words, “With
[h]olacracy adopted at the board level, the board does not exist to steward
the company for the sake of its shareholders, or even for the sake of all of
its stakeholders, but rather to steward it for the organization itself—in
other words, for expressing the organization’s purpose.”67
The governance structure of Holacracy One, LLC, provides unique
answers to the questions raised by the holacracy model. As the name
makes clear, Holacracy One is a Pennsylvania LLC, and it takes advantage
of the significant flexibility provided by the LLC model.68 The operating
agreement specifically adopts the holacracy constitution and vests “[t]he
management and control of the [c]ompany and of its business” to the
constitution.69 The anchor circle is singled out as the site of certain
enumerated rights and powers, including specifying the company’s
60
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purpose, selling company assets, or prosecuting legal claims.70 However,
the agreement also purports to eliminate fiduciary duties on the part of the
company’s managers “to the fullest extent permitted by applicable law,”
except for the duty of good faith and fair dealing.71 The anchor circle
works without a lead link and requires a cross-link for the purposes of
linking up with key stakeholder groups.72 Although the cross-links must
“remain defined to represent the [m]embers in their capacity as financial
investment stakeholders in the [c]ompany,”73 their purpose is not to
maximize investor wealth; rather, it is to express the purpose of the
organization and insure that the purpose is adhered to throughout the
organization.74 The organization’s purpose plays an important role in both
resolving disputes and setting the terms for evaluation. The board orients
itself around the organization’s purpose rather than the usual shareholder
wealth maximization norm.
Holacracy One, LLC, also defines its workers as “partners” for
purposes of the LLC.75 All workers receive Class P membership units,
which provide for a guaranteed draw from the company. 76 The Class P
units can, under certain restrictions, be exchanged for investor shares.77
Because they are members of the LLC, the company does not consider the
workers to be employees; instead they are like partners or LLC members.78
Partners have governance rights through the holacracy constitution.
According to Robertson, the move to a partnership model is in keeping
with the shift in authority and accountability from CEOs and supervisors
to the average worker.79
2. Governance Processes
Governance processes are critical to self-managed teams, and
holacracy is no exception. Along with the governance structure based on
roles, domains, and circles, holacracy adopts a stylized version of
governance meetings and dispute resolution which move beyond
discussions or elections. The process, described in Article III of the
70
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holacracy constitution, involves discrete steps taken to raise issues—
known as “tensions”—and then address and hopefully resolve those
tensions.80
Restructuring the processes of governance is critical to holacracy
because governance is so important to the holacracy structure. As
Robertson notes, “[w]hen you replace top-down leadership with a process,
that process needs to be robust and sophisticated enough to keep everyone
aligned and unified as they navigate the complexity of their daily
business.”81 The circle’s facilitator and secretary largely manage the
governance processes and implement the decisions arrived at in the
meetings.82 The meetings allow members of the circle to transform
existing structures and adapt to changing conditions.
During governance meetings, participants can: create, amend, or
eliminate roles; create, amend, or eliminate policies that govern within the
circle; create, amend, or eliminate sub-circles; and elect members to
specific roles.83 These meeting follow a strict choreography that allows
all members to participate but channels such participation into fairly
specific areas. For example, during the check-in round, all are invited to
contribute, but none are allowed to discuss or respond to another’s
contribution.84 The facilitator leads the group through the process and
endeavors to resolve any tensions—perceptions of a “specific gap between
current reality and a sensed potential.”85 A tension raised in the “agenda
building” session is then addressed through the “integrative decisionmaking process,” which provides participants with specific opportunities
to propose solutions and raise objections.86 Proposals are adopted if no
objections are left unaddressed in the view of all of the members of the
group.87 This decision-making process is more fully described within the
holacracy literature, but its essence is an effort to push people through a
series of steps to reach an ultimate conclusion.88 The facilitator must
carefully keep participants on target for each particular round of
participation and must make judgment calls about when someone’s
comment is not relevant or when a proposal lies outside the circle’s
jurisdiction.89 Governance meetings are separate from operations
80
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meetings, and the facilitator should reject efforts to bring in crossover
material.90 Strategic decisions can be covered in tactical meetings that
follow a similar format but focus on operational issues and ongoing
projects.91 The secretary records the meeting’s results; software platforms,
such as Glass Frog, assist holacracy secretaries in keeping track of the
governance changes.92
Within the governance process, holacracy employs a unique
election process—known as the “integrative election process”—through
which elected roles are assigned.93 The process begins with each person
filling out a ballot—no abstentions allowed—with their nominee.94 These
nominees are then explained and proposed to the group, and the facilitator
leads the groups through a winnowing process whereby a final “proposal”
is settled upon.95 This proposal must then survive a round of potential
objections; if it does, then the nominee goes through.96
The holacracy process is not simple, and Robertson recommends
that larger organizations employ a holacracy consultant or “coach” in
order to get the process underway.97 At the very least, training is necessary
for all employees, since all employees participate in the governance
process.98 In this regard, holacracy is very much like other selfmanagement systems. Buurtzorg also follows a very specific selfmanagement process, and all new members undergo training in “solutiondriven methods of interaction.”99 Similar to holacracy, the group chooses
a facilitator who then leads the group through a process that responds to
objections, allows all voices to be heard, and settles on a solution.100
Unlike holacracy, however, there is no lead link on the Buurtzorg teams—
all of the nurses have the same governance rights.101 But both processes
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share a common understanding that the team and the process are to be
respected above personal prerogative and individual interests.102
Adapting to a nonhierarchical governance framework can be
difficult for many employees as the traditional framework relieves the
average employee of the burden of decision-making and responsibility.103
Moreover, the process can be difficult to understand at first, with each
system having its unique jargon about “tensions,” “objections,” and
“domains.”104 But these structured processes for dialogue and decision are
necessary to prevent the team-production process from descending into
chaos.
3. Organizational Purpose.
The idea of “purpose” is central to holacracy. It provides the core
principle around which all of this process turns. Roles and circles are
created, tensions are processed, and actions are justified all based on the
central purpose of the organization and the subsidiary principles that flow
therefrom. The Holacracy Constitution specifies that the anchor circle of
the organization is established in order “to express the overall Purpose of
the Organization.”105 The purpose is described as “the deepest creative
potential [the organization] can sustainably express in the world, given all
of the constraints acting upon it and everything available to it.”106 In
determining the purpose, the anchor circle is to look to the organization’s
“history, current capacities, available resources, Partners, character,
culture, business structure, brand, market awareness, and all other relevant
resources or factors.”107 The anchor circle also has the authority to update
the purpose as necessary, but if the anchor circle has a lead link, the lead
link has the organization’s purpose within its accountabilities by default.108
The purpose-oriented organization is another facet of holacracy’s
focus on structure and process rather than on people. The organization
exists above and apart from the people who populate it at any given time.
As such, it must have an independent purpose that justifies its existence
102
ROBERTSON, supra note 7, at 110 (“[The facilitator’s] responsibility is not to support
or take care of the people; it is to protect the process, which itself allows people to take care of
themselves.”).
103
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and frames its actions.109 Holacracy does not seem to have any ulterior or
metaphysical idea in mind. Instead, the purpose is simply the concept that
drives what the company does. As Robertson notes, “[t]he purpose of a
garbage disposal company might be simply ‘to create cleaner cities’—
which may not be glamorous, but nonetheless gets at the ‘why’ behind
what the company does, and expresses a potential that the company is well
suited to bring about in the world.”110 Holacracy expressly rejects the idea
that the organization is simply the agglomeration of the personal
aspirations of its participants; instead, the organization’s purpose must be
found by its participants and must be followed in the organization’s
activities.111
Once established, the purpose does seem to have organizational
power over the participants. Within the anchor circle, circle members
must justify their decisions based on the organization’s purpose. Unlike
traditional corporations, where shareholder wealth maximization is
generally the de facto and de jure corporate purpose, the holacratic
organization looks to the purpose in order to justify transformational
decisions like a merger, acquisition, or dissolution.112 And in the
holacracy governance process, purpose plays a key role in structuring the
dialogue within governance. For example, an objection within the
integrative decision-making process “needs to be related to a particular
role the objector fills, and to describe how the proposal would diminish
the role’s capacity to express its purpose or enact its accountabilities.” 113
Purpose drives the conversations.
Other self-managed or “teal” organizations also share this emphasis
on purpose. Described as “evolutionary purpose” by Laloux, these
organizations orient around an idea, a goal, a direction, and then imbue the
entire organization with that sense.114 Buurtzorg, for example, has a
specific purpose: “to help sick and elderly patients live a more autonomous
and meaningful life.”115 This purpose exists above and beyond the
organization itself. Buurtzorg thus sees other nursing organizations not as
competitors, but rather as allies in the struggle to pursue this purpose.
109
ROBERTSON, supra note 7, at 33 (“Said another way, what does this organization
want to be in the world, and what does the world need this organization to be?”).
110
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111
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Metrics like market share, growth, and profits are not important relative to
the overall goal. Buurtzorg’s tremendous growth may in fact be in
furtherance of the purpose as it provides Buurtzorg’s innovative services
to a broader group of patients. But it is subsidiary to the organization’s
overall purpose. Purpose also drives strategy, at all levels of the
organization: “people in these companies have a very clear, keen sense of
the organization’s purpose and a broad sense of the direction the
organization might be called to go.”116
Because the purpose is fluid, it may not be ensconced in the business
organization’s charter or operating agreement with a great deal of
specificity. The Holacracy One, LLC, has a somewhat ambiguous purpose
in its operating agreement:
Purposes of Company. The Company was initially formed
for the purpose, to the extent permitted by the Act, of
discovering and clarifying the deepest creative potential the
Organization is best-suited to sustainably express in the
world, given all of the constraints operating upon it and
everything available for its use in such expression, including
its history, current capacities, available resources, Partners,
character, culture, business structure, brand, market
awareness, and all other resources or factors which may be
relevant . . . .117
This passage is essentially a paraphrasing of the Holacracy Constitution’s
definition of purpose rather than an actual and specific purpose. Because
this purpose is locked in through the operating agreement, the LLC has
preserved its legal flexibility while arguably derogating the substantive
nature of the holacracy purpose requirement.
The primary purpose of the organization leads to the establishment
of subsidiary circles, which each have their own subsidiary purposes
within the overall purpose.118 When roles are established within these
circles, each role must have a purpose along with a domain and an
accountability.119 Although its domain defines the area of operation for a
role, the role’s purpose is also important in justifying the actions within
116
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the role.120 These purposes are recorded within the governance recordkeeping system and can be referred to by the participants as they conduct
the firm’s business.121
These three components—internal constitutional structure, complex
governance processes, and evolutionary purpose—make up the core of the
holacracy system. They are also generally shared by other self-managed
or “teal” organizations, but holacracy has a uniform and comprehensive
approach that allows for more particularized study of these characteristics.
To what extent are these differences meaningful under the law? Do we
need to think our traditional legal approaches to these firms? The
following Parts undertake an exploration of these questions.
II. HOLACRACY AND ORGANIZATIONAL IDENTITY
The holacracy system of management changes the internal structure
of business organizations from a command-and-control system to a
devolved system of shared power. But before turning to the effects of that
change on the law of firm governance, it is important to recognize that
holacracy changes the way we think about the organizations themselves.
First, holacracy, and its use of the body as metaphor, provides a new
perspective on the way we think about firms as entities or aggregates.
Second, holacracy’s focus on organizational purpose challenges our
diminished expectations for the role of purpose in corporations and other
business entities. These altered perspectives provide new insights about
the roles of these organizations within our economy.
A. The Entity/Aggregate Debate
Ever since the law has allowed people to form organizations, the
nature of these organizations has caused doctrinal and even metaphysical
puzzles.122 Are organizations simply the sum of their parts—an
aggregation of those who are involved in the enterprise—or is the
organization itself an entity?123 And is this organization, when represented
120
HOLACRACY CONST., art. I, § 3 (“As a Partner assigned to a Role, you have the
authority to execute any Next-Actions you reasonably believe are useful for enacting your Role’s
Purpose or Accountabilities.”).
121
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as a legally created association, an artificially created entity or a “real”
entity in the social and legal sense?124 These questions have remained an
open question within corporate law and business entity law more
generally.125 Scholars have identified three separate theories of corporate
personhood: the aggregate theory, the artificial entity theory, and the
natural entity theory.126 Beyond the philosophical interest in such
questions, they also may have an effect on corporate policy and doctrine.127
For example, those who argue for the artificial entity theory may use it to
push for greater state regulation of the corporation, while those who argue
in favor of the aggregate theory may advocate for fewer restrictions
because the aggregation is voluntary.128
Holacracy’s approach adds a new layer to this debate by melding
together all three theories in its perspective of the organization. Rather
than coming down on the side of entity or aggregate, holacracy supports a
blended conception that uses the human body as a metaphor for the
organization.129 While the body as a whole is one unit, it is supported by
a variety of systems within systems that work together to ensure the
functioning of the unit. Each cell, for example, is “both a self-contained,
whole entity and a part of a larger whole, an organ.”130 Similarly, each
organ is both a self-contained whole and also part of a whole.131 This
metaphor, in and of itself, may seem fairly straightforward. But holacracy
takes the metaphor and uses to it to justify its devolution of power to
individual teams of employees:
124
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The rather miraculous human body functions efficiently and
effectively not with a top-down command system but with a
distributed system—a network of autonomous selforganizing entities distributed throughout the body. Each of
these entities, which are your cells, organs, and organ
systems, has capacity to take in messages, process them, and
generate output. Each has a function and has the autonomy
to organize how it completes that function.132
If each cell, organ, or organ system had to be separately commanded by
the brain, our systems would not work. Holacracy carries this analysis
through to its system of roles and circles. Roles are similar to the
individual cells while circles are like organs. Each role and circle must
have an independent set of functions while, at the same time, must
recognize itself as part of an overall whole.133
I do not mean to make too much of holacracy’s use of analogy here;
obviously, the analogy is not only a common one, but also an imperfect
one.134 However, given the recent revival in the debate over the
appropriate conception of the corporation, particularly at the Supreme
Court,135 holacracy’s melding of theory and application does add usefully
to the ongoing contemplations on the issue. Neither the entity theory nor
the aggregate theory completely captures the facets of organizational
existence. Instead, holacracy advocates for a system of entities within
entities as the appropriate way to think through some of our larger
questions of corporate identity.136 This approach also lends itself to a new
way of thinking about corporate and organizational purpose.
B. Organizational Purpose
Holacracy puts organizational purpose front and center. Deriving
the entity’s purpose is one of the first things to be done when the initial
132
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“anchor circle” is established.137 Certainly, having a set of goals, or a
mission statement, or another statement of purpose is not unusual in
Corporate America.138 But the holacracy focus on purpose is imbedded
into the constitution and informs the company’s governance processes.
Moreover, this purpose is mission-driven. In that respect, a holacracyderived purpose differs markedly from the de facto and de jure purpose of
for-profit corporations: to maximize the wealth of shareholders. Thus, the
primary questions for the law will be: to what extent does an
organizational purpose, when achieved through holacracy, have legal
meaning, and, to what extent can it override the shareholder wealth
maximization norm?
In the earlier days of our republic, the law required corporations to
establish a specific purpose as part of the incorporation process.139 The
purpose specified the nature of the business to be established and provided
a sense of scope. This purpose was not merely hortatory—it established
the boundaries of activities for participants within the firm.140 It could be
seen as jurisdictional in nature: the corporation could not operate outside
of the markers of its delineated activity. This limitation was justified by
the power that the state had provided to the corporation to exist in the first
place. The first corporations could only be formed for a limited set of
prescribed purposes, such a starting a university or building a canal.141 But
as the scope of potential business purposes widened, the need for a specific
purpose remained; an unlimited corporation could, theoretically, seek
unlimited power.142 Therefore, corporations needed to specify their
purpose as part of their chartering documents.143 The purpose requirement
was enforced through an ultra vires, or “beyond the powers,” legal action.
137
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charter or pursuant to the provisions of a general law, always have been, and still are, accustomed
to incorporate any given body of associates for some, and not for all, purposes.”).
138
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Under this doctrine, shareholders could sue the corporation if it went
beyond the scope of its purpose, as established in the charter.144 Because
it limited the reach of corporate power to enumerated purposes, the ultra
vires doctrine was “an important tool to protect the state's interest in
restricting the power and size of corporations and to protect the
shareholders from managerial overreaching.”145 Cases typically involved
a corporation purchasing another company that was outside of the firm’s
specified scope or carrying on business in violation of its charter.146 In
some cases, contracts were rendered void if the one party knew that the
other party was acting ultra vires.147 This led to the odd situation of
corporations seeking to escape obligations on the grounds that they had
exceeded their powers.148
As corporations became more commonplace and less attention was
paid to the specific charters, the ultra vires doctrine began to break down.
Other doctrines came to occupy the same regulatory space: antitrust
provided a better tool for preventing corporate overreaching and
monopoly while shareholders brought derivative suits to enforce director
and officer fiduciary duties.149 Ultra vires prohibitions remain on the
144
Adam J. Sulkowski & Kent Greenfield, A Bridle, A Prod, and A Big Stick: An
Evaluation of Class Actions, Shareholder Proposals, and the Ultra Vires Doctrine as Methods
for Controlling Corporate Behavior, 79 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 929, 930 (2005) (“The ultra vires
doctrine historically allowed a shareholder to sue to prevent a company from engaging in an
activity outside of the specific parameters of its corporate charter.”).
145
Kent Greenfield, Ultra Vires Lives! A Stakeholder Analysis of Corporate Illegality
(with Notes on How Corporate Law Could Reinforce International Law Norms), 87 VA. L. REV.
1279, 1302 (2001).
146
See id.
147
Recent Cases, Corporations - Ultra Vires - Continuing Contract Made for an
Unauthorized Purpose, 27 HARV. L. REV. 680, 680 (1914) (finding a contract for the sale of
coal to a railroad for resale was void if the seller was chargeable with knowledge of the railroad's
unlawful purpose—namely, to resell the coal outside of its scope as a common carrier).
148
Cf. Colo. Springs Co. v. Am. Pub. Co., 97 F. 843, 849 (8th Cir. 1899) (“The question
concerning its power to execute the contracts is not raised by the state, but by the corporation
itself, to avoid a liability to another corporation with which it has contracted; and for these
reasons a more liberal view may be taken of its implied powers than could otherwise be
entertained.”). Because of the potential for abuses under this approach, courts began to rein in
the doctrine. See Editorial, Ultra Vires Contracts in the Federal Courts, 19 HARV. L. REV. 608,
609 (1906) (“In consequence there has been generally adopted a working rule lying half way
between the two above suggested, and making an ultra vires contract neither quite void nor
voidable by any particular party, nor yet quite good; but a thing which is a type unto itself, —
bad unless there is some reason of justice or expediency to the contrary. Thus a wholly executory
ultra vires contract is treated as if illegal, but if one side has performed, so that such treatment
would cause hardship, a remedy is given.”).
149
Prior to the New Deal securities acts, shareholders were still in a position to bring
contract claims against officers if the corporation exceeded its purpose. Charles E. Carpenter,
Should the Doctrine of Ultra Vires Be Discarded?, 33 YALE L.J. 49, 65 (1923) (“If the officers
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books in almost every state.150 Consequently, corporations learned to have
as broad a corporate purpose as possible.151 Today, even though
corporations are allowed to have specific purposes, for-profit companies
generally follow specific language: the corporation is formed to conduct
and transact all lawful business activities allowed under the laws of the
state.152
At around the same time as ultra vires actions were disappearing,
the notion of shareholder primacy was beginning to take hold. Two
influential works on this score—one a case, the other a book—emerged to
frame the debate. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co. (“Dodge”),153 emphasized the
responsibility of management to run the company in the interests of the
Through the shareholder action, the minority
shareholders.154
shareholders were able to force the controlling shareholder to provide a
substantial dividend.155 (The plaintiffs had also brought a claim of ultra
vires, but it was dismissed by the court.156) The Modern Corporation and
Private Property provided a structural theory of shareholder rights in the
face of management opportunism.157 These two sources both represented
the idea of shareholder primacy—the idea that the corporation is to be run
of the corporation enter into an ultra vires contract without the assent of the stockholder they
violate his contract. For this he has his remedy. He may sue the officers for breach of contract.”).
150
Sulkowsi & Greenfield, supra note 144, at 945 (“The incorporation statutes of fortynine states allow these states to dissolve a corporation or enjoin it from engaging in ultra
vires activities--that is, activities outside of the corporation's authority.”).
151
See, e.g., Recent Cases, Corporations - Ultra Vires: What Acts Are Ultra Vires - IllDefined Objects of Incorporation, 32 HARV. L. REV. 285, 290 (1919) (discussing a corporate
purpose “enabling the company to carry on almost every conceivable kind of business which
such an organization could adopt”).
152
Joan MacLeod Heminway, Corporate Purpose and Litigation Risk in Publicly Held
U.S. Benefit Corporations, 40 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 611, 618 (2017) (“[F]or-profit corporations,
including social enterprises organized as corporations, usually take advantage of the full breadth
of the permitted purposes for which a corporation can be organized and operated under the
applicable state law.”). For an example of this language, see MISSOURI DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
FAQs, http://www.sos.mo.gov/business/faqs.asp (citing a “general purpose” which states that
“[t]he corporation is formed to conduct and transact all lawful business activities allowed under
the laws of the State of Missouri”) (last visited May 3, 2018).
153
170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
154
Id. at 684 (“A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the
profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be employed for that end. The
discretion of directors is to be exercised in the choice of means to attain that end and does not
extend to a change in the end itself, to the reduction of profits or to the nondistribution of profits
among stockholders in order to devote them to other purposes.”); Gordon Smith, The
Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277, 322 (1998) (persuasively arguing that Dodge is
actually about horizontal equity—the need to run the business in the interest of all shareholders
and not just the controlling ones).
155
Dodge, 170 N.W. at 685.
156
Id. at 681.
157
ADOLF BERLE & GARDINER MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY 1, 380 (Transaction Publishers rev. ed. 1932).
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in the financial interest of the shareholders. As corporations were
dropping specific purposes from their charters, the shareholder primacy
norm was stepping in to provide a purpose in its place. The norm was
supercharged in the 1970s with the push to increase shareholder returns
through hostile takeovers and private equity acquisitions. The nascent law
and economics movement provided intellectual ballast to the changing
economic and financial norms. For the last fifteen to twenty years, if not
more, the shareholder wealth maximization norm has dominated both
boardrooms and the academic literature.158
The importance of the shareholder primacy norm lies not only in its
cultural sway. The norm also has the force of law. As the Dodge language
first made clear, shareholders have the legal right to expect that the
corporation will be run in their interest. Certainly, the business judgment
rule provides a significant zone of activity within which the corporation
can make decisions concerning its everyday business. But the norm has
legal force in many states—Delaware being the most prominent. The
recent words of then-Chancellor Chandler make the point plainly: “Having
chosen a for-profit corporate form, the craigslist directors are bound by the
fiduciary duties and standards that accompany that form. Those standards
include acting to promote the value of the corporation for the benefit of its
stockholders.”159
Holacracy and shareholder primacy are, at best, uneasy bedfellows.
The holacracy governance structure can fit within an otherwise
traditionally structured corporation; the board of directors can retain all of
its traditional powers but create a holacracy beneath it.160 However,
holacracy’s focus on purpose elevates the organization’s needs above the
needs of the shareholders and replaces shareholder primacy with what
might (clumsily) be called “purpose-primacy.”
As described in
Holacracy:
However you choose to populate your board, Holacracy also
reframes the purpose of the board’s stewardship of the
organization. With Holacracy adopted at a board level, the
board does not exist to steward the company for the sake of
its shareholders, or even for the sake of all of its stakeholders,
158

Lynn A. Stout, The Toxic Side Effects of Shareholder Primacy, 161 U. PA. L. REV.
2003, 2004 (2013) (“Many, and possibly most, public companies now embrace a shareholdercentered vision of good corporate governance that emphasizes ‘maximizing shareholder value’
(typically measured by share price) over all other corporate goals.”).
159
eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 34 (Del. Ch. 2010).
160
ROBERTSON, supra note 7, at 163–64. For further discussion of structural issues, see
infra Part III.
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but rather to steward it for the organization itself—in other
words, for expressing the organization’s purpose.
Interestingly, this makes the distinction between for-profit
and nonprofit less relevant. Organizations running with
Holacracy are first and foremost purpose-driven, regardless
of their tax structure, with all activities ultimately being for
the sake of realizing the organization’s broader purpose.161
A holacracy-governed organization would not follow the shareholder
primacy norm. Instead, it would focus on the organization’s purpose, as
derived through the holacracy process.
The holacracy literature is somewhat vague on the role of
shareholders within the organization, as that literature offers a “broad tent”
approach to encourage widespread adoption.162 At the same time, a true
holacracy would reject shareholder primacy as the governing norm.
Holacracy-governed corporations could potentially present the next wave
of challenges to Delaware’s recent confirmation of the primacy norm. In
eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark,163 the Court of Chancery
rescinded the directors’ adoption of a shareholder rights plan that restricted
minority shareholders’ ability to purchase shares and to freely sell shares
as well as their effort to obtain a right of first refusal for the corporation
over the shares held by minority shareholders.164 However, if a holacratic
corporation took similar steps, would its adoption of holacracy be
sufficient to put shareholders on notice that it would not follow the
shareholder primacy norm? Could a holacratic corporation opt out of the
Revlon rule?165 To some extent, the question is whether shareholder
primacy is a default rule, and if it is, whether the choice of holacracy is
161

ROBERTSON, supra note 7, at 166.
Id. at 163.
163
16 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. 2010)
164
Id. at 34–35.
165
The Revlon rule regards a company’s ability to either sell the company or otherwise
divest complete control of the company; further, under Revlon, the board must seek to secure
the highest possible bid once it has committed to selling. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes
Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). For an expansion on the Revlon rule, see
BAINBRIDGE, supra note 39, at 406 (“Once a Revlon auction begins, it no longer matters whether
benefiting nonshareholder interests may also benefit shareholders. Instead, shareholder wealth
maximization is the board’s only appropriate concern.”) (quoting Revlon., 506 A.2d at 182).
Further, Delaware courts have not permitted corporations to waive the Revlon duties
prospectively. For an opposing viewpoint, see David Jackson & Joseph B. Frumkin, The Global
Role of Corporate Law, 25 DEL. J. CORP. L. 106, 119 (2000) (asking whether “the Delaware
legislature, with the recommendation of the Delaware Bar, [might] be prepared to say that if you
duly incorporate with a U.K. company, [you could] opt out in your charter from Revlon and
Unocal, for example, and defer to the semi-private takeover board regulation which works in
England”).
162
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sufficient to opt out of it. But if shareholder primacy is a mandatory rule
within Delaware, the choice of business organization becomes more
important for holacracy-interested firms.
C. Choice of Organizational Form
The corporation is the most common form of business organization
in the United States today.166 However, there is an underappreciated
variety of different business association types that are available to
businesses: partnerships, limited partnerships (LPs), limited liability
partnerships (LLPs), limited liability companies (LLCs), and—newest on
the scene—the benefit corporation. Because of its unique take on the
nature of the holacratic business entity as well as the focus on a broader
purpose, holacratic firms may wish to explore alternative legal models for
the formation and continuing governance of their firms.
The benefit corporation may, in fact, seem tailor-made for
holacracy.167 The signal change from corporation to benefit corporation is
its rejection of the shareholder primacy norm for a more sociallybeneficial corporate purpose. This purpose must fit within the rubric of
“social benefit” as defined by the state statute. Although most states
provide a relatively broad definition,168 the benefit corporation restrains
itself by opting for a purpose that can then be used as a metric. State
benefit corporation law usually includes some mechanisms for enforcing
the “benefit” component, such as benefit reporting, a benefit officer,
166
Matthew T. Bodie, Income Inequality and Corporate Structure, 45 STETSON L. REV.
69, 71 (2015) (“Although a variety of different business organizational forms exist, such as the
partnership, the limited liability company (LLC), and the sole proprietorship, the corporation
clearly dominates the economic landscape.”).
167
See Matthew J. Dulac, Sustaining the Sustainable Corporation: Benefit Corporations
and the Viability of Going Public, 104 GEO. L.J. 171, 175 (2015) (“A benefit corporation is a
for-profit corporation with a stated public benefit that operates in a responsible and sustainable
manner; in other words, it pursues the dual mission of making a profit and achieving some social
good.”). Benefit corporations (sometimes called B corps) are a form of business organization
created by state statutes to promote a more socially-responsible orientation within the business.
See Brett McDonnell, Benefit Corporations and Strategic Action Fields or (The Existential
Failing of Delaware), 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 263, 280 (2016) (“State statutes legally define
benefit corporations. These statutes sit atop the basic business corporation statute. That is,
benefit corporations are business corporations, subject to all of the rules of the business
corporation statute, except insofar as the benefit corporation statute provides different or
additional rules.”).
168
Delaware defines public benefit, as “a positive effect (or reduction of negative
effects) on 1 or more categories of persons, entities, communities or interests (other than
stockholders in their capacities as stockholders) including, but not limited to, effects of an
artistic, charitable, cultural, economic, educational, environmental, literary, medical, religious,
scientific or technological nature.” DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 362 (2016).
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fiduciary duties related to the benefit, or ultra vires actions if the purpose
is ignored. This new model might seem to match up well with the more
socially-oriented framework of holacracy.
However, holacracy has not embraced the benefit corporation
model. When holacracy talks of purpose, it does not specifically designate
a “socially beneficial” purpose to the organization. Because it seeks
widespread adoption as a governance method for firms of all shapes, sizes,
and economic motives, holacracy does not want to be pigeonholed in the
“green” or “good” economic space. Certainly, other integral or “teal”
organizations may naturally gravitate towards a higher aim; Buurtzorg, for
example, seeks to “help sick and elderly patients live a more autonomous
and meaningful life.”169 But these organizations may simply seek to better
serve their customers; that idea, specified and framed as a purpose, is
sufficient for holacracy. Moreover, for a company already grappling with
the complexity of holacracy, adding in the new benefit corporation
requirements may be piling too much on. It is even uncertain to what
extent benefit corporations may escape from the shareholder primacy
norm itself.170
Holacracy One, LLC—as its name makes clear—opted to form as a
limited liability company.171 It has included a purpose in its operating
agreement, but a beneficial purpose is not required for LLCs, and
Holacracy One’s purpose is actually fairly vague.172 Other than the duty
of good faith and fair dealing towards the LLC members, the operating
agreement expressly endeavors to exclude fiduciary duties owed by the
firm managers to the extent allowed under law.173 There is no specific
mechanism for enforcing the company’s purpose. The operating
agreement does have an arbitration clause providing “final, binding and
non-appealable arbitration” for disputes that arise within the agreement.174
Holacracy’s emphasis on organizational purpose, as discussed in
Part II.B. above, appears to be a jarring contrast with Holacracy One’s
vague and unenforceable statement of purpose. But I think the latter
primarily reflects an effort to keep governance within the holacracy
governance process and outside of the courts. This may seem of a piece
with the familiar managerialism that is commonplace in all types of firms.
But the holacracy movement is intent on creating its own private form of
169
LALOUX, supra note 6, at 195. This purpose is not recorded in writing, but is spoken
about frequently in order to keep it “alive” and prevent it from “becoming constraining.” Id. at
201.
170
Heminway, supra note 152, at 632–33.
171
Holacracy One Operating Agreement, supra note 32, Preamble, at 1.
172
Id. § 2.4, at 7.
173
Id. § 3.5, at 9.
174
Id. § 17.8, at 37.
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governance. To some extent, litigating over internal matters is opting out
of the holacracy process, and holacracy is all about that internal process.
In that respect, Holacracy One is an example of the organizational
flexibility that commentators, such as Larry Ribstein175 and Justin
Blount176 have touted in their writings. Although both Ribstein and Blount
preferred shareholder primacy as a normative matter, they argued that the
organizational tools existed to pursue other models of governance within
business organizations. Holacracy One took the freedom to escape from
shareholder primacy and, in its place, only inserted an unenforceable
placeholder. But if participants want legal rights as to the firm’s purpose,
the public benefit corporation is developing those enforcement
mechanisms. The success of benefit corporations, as opposed to LLCs or
other vehicles, may show us whether the “market” for integrated
organizations wants a legally-enforceable social benefit purpose—or just
an internally enforced one.
For the rest of this article, however, we will primarily assume that
the holacratic organization in question is a corporation. Although
partnerships, LLPs, and LLCs have their advantages, it is more difficult to
build a large-scale, publicly-financed business entity without the corporate
frame.177 LLCs may make the most sense for smaller, closely-held
businesses like Holacracy One.178
But corporations remain the
organization of choice for larger, publicly-traded entities—the kind that
drive most of our economy. Moreover, holacracy has significant effects
on our traditional notions of corporate structure within the corporate form.
It is to these changes in firm governance that we now turn.
III. HOLACRACY AND FIRM MANAGEMENT
Holacracy’s claim to fame is its upending of the traditional
corporate hierarchy and its installation of a constitutional system of team
governance. It is a radical departure from existing managerial norms and
175
LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE RISE OF THE UNCORPORATION 1, 14 (New York, Oxford
University Press 2010).
176
Blount has argued that “it is clearly the case that existing corporate law allows for
the creation of corporate entities in which multiple stakeholders have a formal role in
governance.” Justin Blount, Creating A Stakeholder Democracy Under Existing Corporate Law,
18 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 365, 368 (2016).
177
See RIBSTEIN, supra note 175, at 153, 179–82 (discussing the limitations of LLCs,
including the binary choice of manager- and member-management, restrictions on the
transferability of management rights, and the lack of a default right to disassociate).
178
LARRY E. RIBSTEIN & JEFFREY M. LIPSHAW, UNINCORPORATED BUSINESS
ENTITIES 417 (LexisNexis, 4th ed. 2009) (“Acceptance of the LLC has grown to the extent that
it is now the dominant business form for closely held firms.”).
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would dramatically change workplace culture. But what does holacracy
mean for the law of firm management? Would we have to think differently
about the legal rights and responsibilities of those who run our companies?
A. The Board of Directors
Most businesses with significant numbers of employees are
structured as corporations.179 Corporations are creatures of state law:
fictional entities that entitle the participants to certain rights. The
corporation is formed through a corporate charter or articles of
incorporation.180 Although states may not technically require a board of
directors,181 the board is an almost universal feature.182 The directors
manage the firm and may bind the corporation through contracts and
transfers of property.183 Shareholders select the directors at the annual
shareholders meeting.184 Directors are bound to act in the interests of the
firm through common law fiduciary duties of care, good faith, and loyalty.
However, the directors delegate the actual job of running the business to
the officers, primarily through a hierarchy headed by the CEO.185 This
structure provides the basics of corporate law: shareholders select the
directors, who in turn select the officers to run the corporation.
The default rule for holacracy is to leave this structure in place.186
The holacratic process is about internal firm management, not capital
structure. This decision is likely, in part, strategic: it is much easier to get
a CEO to adopt holacracy as a managerial philosophy and practice rather
than for the board to commit to holacracy on behalf of the entire
organization. If adopted by the firm’s management or even by the board
on behalf of the firm’s management (leaving the board in place), there is
179
See Andrew Lundeen & Kyle Pomerleau, Corporations Make up 5 Percent of
Businesses but Earn 62 Percent of Revenues, TAX FOUND. (Nov. 25, 2014),
https://tinyurl.com/yaaue3xx (sixty-two percent of organizational tax revenues come from
corporations); see also RIBSTEIN, supra note 175, at 4 (“The corporation undeniably has driven
business growth in the United States since the Industrial Revolution.”).
180
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 101(a) (2016).
181
See, e.g., id. § 141(a) (“The business and affairs of every corporation organized under
this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors, except as may be
otherwise provided in this chapter or in its certificate of incorporation.”).
182
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01 (2010).
183
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (2016).
184
Id. § 211.
185
See, e.g., id. § 142(a) (“Every corporation organized under this chapter shall have
such officers with such titles and duties as shall be stated in the bylaws or in a resolution of the
board of directors which is not inconsistent with the bylaws.”).
186
ROBERTSON, supra note 7, at 151 (suggesting that beginning holacracy adopters use
a CEO policy, rather than board-level action, “to avoid the extra complexity of getting boardlevel buy-in up front”).
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relatively little effect on the board.187 As a next step, the board could retain
its role within the company but implement holacracy at the board level.
This change would reorient the board as the anchor circle, with the General
Company circle as the only sub-circle.188 The board’s lead link to the
General Company circle would be akin to the CEO, without the CEO’s
usual authority to circumvent internal governance processes. There would
be no lead link at the board level, and the board would have a fairly similar
structure. However, it would use the holacracy governance processes to
raise tensions and pursue solutions through an integrative decision-making
process.189 Ultimately, the biggest change would be in the process and not
in the structure.
A further extension of the holacracy approach would be a change
more in the spirit of holacracy than its letter. As one twist on a holacracycentered board, Robertson suggests the possibility of a multi-stakeholder
board constructed through holacracy.190 Such a structure would be too
messy, he suggests, for a conventional board.191 But he argues that
stakeholders would be better able to coexist on the board following the
holacracy rules and integrative governance process.192 Robertson
acknowledges that he cannot speak from authority about such an approach,
but finds it “an intriguing possibility.”193
The law presumes that shareholders, rather than stakeholders, elect
the board of directors.194 However, there are a variety of ways in which a
corporation could create a multi-stakeholder board. For example, in the
articles of incorporation or in the bylaws, the board and/or the shareholders
could install certain director qualifications, such as the requirement that
one director shall be drawn from the ranks of a certain group of employees

187

One important issue would be whether the board could bind itself to employ a
holacratic management structure. As the model holacracy constitution permits holacracy to be
undone the same way in which it was implemented, the board would have the same power to
revoke. HOLACRACY CONST. art. V, § 5. A board could explore amending the corporation’s
charter or bylaws to require holacracy, but those actions could then be undone through the same
amendment process.
188
ROBERTSON, supra note 7, at 163.
189
Id. at 163–64.
190
Id. at 164–65.
191
Id. at 165 (positing that “a multi-stakeholder board in a conventional board power
structure could easily devolve into a deadlock or a ‘tyranny of the majority’”).
192
Id. at 166.
193
Id. at 165.
194
See, e.g., ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 3.1.1, at 94 (1986) (“Shareholders
vote to elect the directors and to approve extraordinary matters like mergers, sale of all assets,
dissolutions, and amendments of the articles of incorporation.”).
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or from the leadership of a certain set of environmental groups. 195
Shareholders would still elect the directors, but those directors would have
to be drawn from certain pools. A more direct method would assign shares
of various classifications to various stakeholders, making them
“shareholders” even if they did not contribute capital.196 These structures
would be more complicated but are permissible under state law.197 Of
course, these structures would dilute the equity shareholders claims, to a
greater or lesser extent, and would be objectionable to those equity holders
on that basis.198 Moreover, for public companies of a certain size, federal
regulations and stock exchange listing requirement involve further
complications.199 But such structures would certainly be available to
smaller and start-up firms, and it makes sense that the holacracy movement
sees allies in the corporate social responsibility and stakeholder
movements.
Holacracy-centered boards would also have to accommodate other
legal requirements regarding composition and structure. The major stock
exchanges require that a majority of directors be independent of
management and define that independence as requiring the absence of
financial interests that would cut against the director’s primary
responsibilities as director.200 Under stock exchange rules, boards must
also have certain committees, such as audit, nominating, and
compensation committees, with particularized composition (as to
independence) and detailed responsibilities.201 Holacracy would have
something to say about the internal governance processes within the
committees and might label them as “sub-circles” within the board’s
anchor circle. The board might also need to incorporate certain procedural
protections to ensure that these committees, particularly the audit
committees, retain certain metrics of independence, power, and

195
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(b) (2016); Blount, supra note 176, at 383–85
(discussing this avenue).
196
Blount, supra note 176, at 385–93.
197
For an example of a corporation that classified shares to allow a director to be elected
with a $10 capital stake, see Lehrman v. Cohen, 222 A.2d 800, 803 (Del. 1966).
198
Blount, supra note 176, at 386.
199
Id. at 393–400. The most difficult obstacles would likely be “voting rights” policies
by NYSE and NASDAQ that prevent disparate restrictions or reductions in the rights of common
equity shareholders. Id. at 395–97 (citing NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, NYSE LISTED
COMPANY MANUAL § 313.00 (2015), https://perma.cc/SF39-SF4J [hereinafter NYSE
MANUAL]; NASDAQ STOCK MARKET, NASDAQ LISTING RULES §§ 5600–40 (2015),
perma.cc/VJS6-RDLC).
200
BAINBRIDGE, supra note 39, at 80–83 (citing NYSE MANUAL §§ 303A.01, 303A.02,
303A.03).
201
Id. at 84–89 (citing NYSE MANUAL §§ 303A.04,303A.05, 303A.06).

34

DELAWARE JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW

VOL. 42

authority.202 Of course, holacracy’s modus operandi is to devolve power
to accountable bodies, so these structural mechanisms would likely
reinforce, rather than contradict, the stock exchange independence
requirements. But these specific requirements would need to be followed.
Finally, holacracy could change the nature—or, at least, seek to
change the nature—of the fiduciary duties that the board owes to the
corporation. The traditional fiduciary duties are those of care and loyalty
towards the firm. The duty of care is substantially mitigated by the
business judgment rule, which provides directors with substantial freedom
from review of the reasonableness of their actions.203 Moreover, there is
no reason to think that holacracy would change the directors’ basic duties
of care. Nor would holacracy impact the duty of loyalty, to the extent it
requires directors to place the interests of the company above their own
personal interests.204 As discussed earlier, holacracy would in fact
dramatically change the existing presumption of shareholder wealth
maximization, which may then alter the board’s approach to certain
questions, such as the sale of substantially all assets through an auction.205
However, for those extraordinary decisions, holacracy may in fact
prioritize the needs of equity holders. To the extent that the board’s
stakeholder orientation would seek to change responsibilities such as
Revlon duties,206 those changes would stand apart from the requirements
of holacracy itself.
B. Officers
Holacracy does not require change to the superstructure of the firm,
at least in composition. A holacratic corporation could still have a board
of directors, and that board could still operate as a traditional board.
However, the nature of the CEO’s position, as well as the other subsidiary
officers, would change dramatically under holacracy. Holacracy is a
system of defined powers and responsibilities. Rather than a monarchy in
which one person’s decisions control the rest of the organization,
holacracy establishes domains of authority throughout the organization
and governance processes that enable a group of people to decide policy.
202
See, e.g., NYSE MANUAL § 303A.07 (listing audit committee requirements such as
a written charter, an annual report, a set of confidential, anonymous reporting whistleblowing
procedures, and the power to retain independent counsel).
203
See CLARK, supra note 194, § 3.4, at 123.
204
See id. § 4.1, at 141.
205
See supra Part II.B.
206
For a discussion of Revlon duties, see Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes
Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986); BAINBRIDGE, supra note 39, at 405–06.
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Rather than holding power at the whim of the CEO, holacracy participants
hold the power that the governance structure has provided.207 It is a “shift
from personal leadership to constitutionally derived power.”208
On a day-to-day level, this change in organizational structure has a
dramatic effect on the CEO position. Authority and responsibility are
taken off the CEO’s shoulders and distributed to the other organizational
players. Robertson describes the “tremendous relief” that most CEOs feel
after a shift to holacracy.209 Should this shift in power also mean a shift in
the legal accoutrements of the position? In other words, perhaps the
holacracy CEO—and other corporate officers—should no longer be
considered “officers” under the law.
Compared to directors, whose role and function are specified clearly
under statute, the role of officers within corporate law is less settled.210
Under Delaware law, officers are creatures of a corporation’s bylaws or
board resolution.211 Thus, it may seem that the firm’s officers are
whomever the corporation designates as such.212 However, there is also
the sense that officers should have some underlying definition that is
consistent across corporations. We see this consistency with various titles:
the CEO is the top of the hierarchy; the chief operating officer is the
second-in-command and in charge of general operations; and the chief
financial officer is primarily responsible for finances and financial risk.
Indeed, a mark of status for a particular business field is to have a “chief
officer” in the subject area, such as “chief information officer” or “chief
privacy officer.”213 However, “officer” is not statutorily defined, and
courts have arrived at different definitions of the term for different
purposes.214 One definition from two well-regarded commentators—one
207
ROBERTSON, supra note 7, at 26 (“Holacracy thus takes some of the organizational
design functions that traditionally reside with a CEO or executive team and place them into
processes that are enacted throughout the organization, with everyone’s participation.”).
208
Id. at 22.
209
Id. at 23.
210
DeMott, supra note 3, at 848.
211
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 142(a) (2016).
212
See, e.g., In re Brocade Commc'ns Sys., Inc. Derivative Litig., 615 F. Supp. 2d 1018,
1049 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (“Brocade's bylaws define ‘officers’ to include ‘one or more Vice
Presidents, and such other Officers that will be appointed by the Board of Directors.’ Jensen, as
the Vice President of HR, was therefore an officer of the Company and did owe it fiduciary
duties.”).
213
For sense of the relative fortunes of these two positions, see Thomas H. Davenport,
Why No One Wants to Be a Chief Information Officer Any More, FORTUNE (Mar. 10, 2016),
https://tinyurl.com/jshbqak; Sarah K. White, 5 Reasons You Need to Hire a Chief Privacy
Officer, CIO (Feb. 1, 2016), https://tinyurl.com/y9adx5ge.
214
Verity Winship, Jurisdiction over Corporate Officers and the Incoherence of Implied
Consent, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1171, 1195–96 (2013) (“While directors are usually easily
identified, the definition of officer is more fluid, and may vary by corporation or by area of the
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of the few definitions available in the literature—is that: “[t]he term
‘officer’ is properly applicable only to those in whom administrative and
executive functions have been entrusted, and does not apply to those
without judgment or discretion as to corporate matters.”215 But this
definition seems significantly overbroad, as it would essentially apply to
all of a firm’s administrative and executive employees that have some
degree of discretion. Another definition describes officers as “executives,
tasked with making decisions about the running of the company.”216 This
definition comes closer, in my view, but in some ways merely replaces
“officers” with “executives.”217
Under holacracy, traditional officer positions would be eliminated
in favor of particularized “roles.” These roles are created within the
governance structure to address needs within the company. There are four
holacracy-related links (lead link, rep link, facilitator, and secretary), but
otherwise the links are generated and eliminated as necessary. As
discussed in Part I, the lead link for the anchor circle is the closest
holacracy comes to a CEO. But the lead link for the anchor circle is
certainly not the same as the CEO. Through holacracy, the CEO hands
over her absolute authority within the corporation to the holacracy
process.218 The power of any particular individual, including a lead link,
is based entirely on the set of roles that the person has. Robertson, for
example, is akin to the CEO of Holacracy One, LLC, but his position
within the company is based on his role as anchor circle lead link along
with over thirty other roles that he serves.219 And roles are different than
positions or titles; while people have a particular title; roles are different
than the people who hold them.220 The role exists whether or not a
particular person fills it, and people take on or shed roles within their
working life with much more fluidity.221
law. ‘Officer’ means one thing for personal jurisdiction, another for securities disclosure rules,
and who-knows-what for triggering state-law fiduciary duties.”).
215
A. Gilchrist Sparks, III & Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Common Law Duties of NonDirector Corporate Officers, 48 BUS. LAW. 215, 216 (1992) (citing Lethem v. Wilson, 185 A.
642, 643 (Pa. 1936); Colonial Capital Co. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 29 F.R.D. 514, 517 (D. Conn.
1961)).
216
John Armour & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Systematic Harms and Shareholder Value, 6 J.
LEGAL ANALYSIS 35, 65 (2014).
217
See supra Part I.B 1 & 2.
218
ROBERTSON, supra note 7, at 151.
219
Brian Robertson, GLASS FROG, https://app.glassfrog.com/people/47 (listing the
“accountabilities” for each of the roles).
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ROBERTSON, supra note 7, at 43 (“Holacracy focuses on clearly differentiating
individuals from the roles they fill.”).
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Id. at 43–45.
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Holacracy’s lack of officers—or, more precisely, the diffusion of
officer responsibilities into governance processes and roles—further
clouds the already murky waters around officers’ fiduciary duties. Such
duties were not established clearly under Delaware law as recently as a
decade ago—but now have been explicitly endorsed.222 However, the
nature of those duties remains ambiguous. Delaware case law declares the
officers’ duties to be “identical” to directors’ duties.223 However, officers
serve the corporation much more directly and have more day-to-day power
over the operations. The Model Business Corporation Act (“MBCA”)
defines officers as employees—which they generally would seem to be.224
Because employees are considered to be agents, they would owe a
different set of additional duties that agents owe to their principals—and
employees owe to their employers.225 Deborah DeMott has advocated for
a much more rigorous set of fiduciary duties based on officers’ unique
roles as high-ranking employees.226 She argues that the duties of loyalty,
care, competence, diligence, and obedience are inherent in the underlying
relationship between officer and corporation.227 In particular, she singles
out the specific agency duty requiring agents to adhere to the instructions
provided by their principals.228 Moreover, DeMott rejects the application
of the business judgment rule to officers as the rule is typically applied
only to corporate directors and not to other agents.229
With holacracy radically redistributing power and authority within
the organization, fiduciary obligations would likely change. The most
straightforward option would allocate duties according to title and find that
none of the non-officerial workers are fiduciaries. This would arguably
follow Delaware law, which has tended to place a premium on the use of
“officer” nomenclature to designate actual officers. However, Delaware
and other states might blanch at the idea of an officer-less organization.
Another potential tack would be to follow the authority “downwards” as
it is reallocated to other various roles. The lead link of the anchor circle
would likely be a fiduciary as that lead link role would have control over
filling roles in the general company circle and would serve as the direct
222
Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 708–09 (Del. 2009) (holding explicitly that
“officers of Delaware corporations, like directors, owe fiduciary duties of care and loyalty, and
that the fiduciary duties of officers are the same as those of directors”).
223
Id. at 708.
224
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 1.40(8).
225
See Lyman P.Q. Johnson & David Millon, Recalling Why Corporate Officers Are
Fiduciaries, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1597, 1601 (2005) (making the case that “corporate
officers are fiduciaries because they are agents”).
226
DeMott, supra note 3, at 859–62.
227
Id. at 859–60.
228
Id. at 859–62.
229
Id. at 866–70
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liaison to the board. However, below that level, it might be difficult for
any one person to accumulate a set of roles that approximate the authority
that officers have in a hierarchical system. Alternatively, courts could
interpret holacracy to mean that all workers have greater fiduciary
responsibilities to the firm because more authority has been devolved to
them. After all, one of the key tenets of holacracy is the allocation of
significant discretion over decision-making to a wider array of firm
participants.230 This may lead to holacracy “officers” being treated as
ordinary employees.231 Ultimately, because holacracy represents such a
deviation from the standard norms of firm hierarchy and organization,
courts may lean more heavily on the holacracy “contract” to determine the
parties’ reasonable expectations.232 The constitution may be seen as a
form of “lawful instructions” to the workers, especially if adopted through
a board resolution. Rather than differentiating between officers and other
employees or agents, courts may adopt more of a case-by-case, spectrum
approach to determining the appropriate level of fiduciary duty owed by a
particular worker or role to the organization.
IV. HOLACRACY AND WORKPLACE LAW
A. Workers as Employees
Like many aspects of organization law, workplace law has also been
built on the assumption of the existence of a hierarchical relationship
within the firm. The assumption of a hierarchy begins with the very
definition of employment itself. Under the traditional common law,
employees—called “servants”—were defined by their relationship with
their “masters.” The Restatement (Second) of Agency defines a servant as
“an agent employed by a master to perform service in his affairs whose
physical conduct in the performance of the service is controlled or is
subject to the right to control by the master.”233 The right to control means
“being entitled to tell the servant when to work (within the hours of
230
Cf. LALOUX, supra note 6, at 113 (noting that all Morning Star employees can
purchase on behalf of the company, provided that they have sought advice from coworkers
beforehand).
231
The fiduciary duties of employees under holacracy are discussed in Part IV.C.
232
Cf. Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A Response
to the Anti-Contractarians, 65 WASH. L. REV. 1 (1990) (arguing in favor of a contractual
approach to fiduciary duties).
233
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1958); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07(3)(a) (AM. LAW INST. 2006) (defining an employee
as “an agent whose principal controls or has the right to control the manner and means of the
agent’s performance of work”).
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service) and when not to work, and what work to do and how to do it.”234
Although the Restatement test includes nine additional factors as part of
the test, the control factor is the first and generally receives the bulk of
analytical attention.235 The Supreme Court has extended the control test
beyond the common law to serve as the default definition for “employee”
whenever used without further explanation in a federal statute.236
The control analysis aligns with several theories about the nature of
the employment relationship. Ronald Coase based his theory of the firm
on the employment relationship.237 The purpose of firms, according to
Coase, is to avoid transaction costs by allowing the parties to organize in
a hierarchical manner without the need for markets, prices, or specific
contracts.238 The control over employees was central to the firm: “If a
workman moves from department Y to department X, he does not go
because of a change in relative prices, but because he was ordered to do
so.”239 Coase then looked to the legal definition of employee to determine
whether his transaction-costs theory was supported in practice.240 Since
the “control” test was based on the employer’s ability to require its
employees to take specific actions, he concluded, “[w]e thus see that it is
the fact of direction which is the essence of the legal concept of ‘employer
and employee,’ just as it was in the economic concept which was
developed above.”241
Others have highlighted hierarchy as a critical feature of
employment. Guy Davidov has argued that the lack of participation in the
control of the enterprise—which he terms “democratic deficits”—is one
of the three “axes” of the employment relationship, along with dependency
234

Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 404 (1937).
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“employee”); Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 302 (1985) (“The
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on the relationship for the fulfillment of certain social and psychological
needs and economic dependency that renders it difficult to spread risks.242
However, Davidov specifies that control “does not necessarily mean
control of the employer over every aspect of the production process.”243
Instead, he argues that control means “the superior power of the employer
vis-à-vis the employee within their relationship and the resulting inability
of the employee to control her own (working) life.”244 These democratic
deficits—the lack of employee power within the firm—justifies the
myriad employment protections that are provided to employees.245
This traditional employment law two-step—employees are
controlled by the employer and therefore deserve employment-related
protections—is called into question by holacracy. Under holacracy,
employees have significantly more control over their working lives than
they do under hierarchical systems. Under a holacracy constitution, the
firm delegates power to a myriad of roles within the firm, with each role
having significant authority. A lead link within a circle—the closest thing
in holacracy to a supervisor—cannot “control” how the member carries
out her role.246 At best, a lead link can assign a member to a particular
role, but then the member has the authority to carry out that role.247 For
example, a member with a particular role is allowed to turn down a
particular assignment from a lead link if the member thinks there is a better
way to achieve the underlying objective.248
Putting workers into this complex constitutional structure may
remove much of the “control” from the traditional definition of
employment. But does that mean they are no longer employees? The
organizational web created by holacracy would certainly not seem to
render the workers within to be independent contractors. Rather than
working independently of any organization, these workers seem to be
working more closely than ever—bound by overlapping relationships and
242

Guy Davidov, The Three Axes of Employment Relationships: A Characterization of
Workers in Need of Protection, 52 U. TORONTO L.J. 357, 394 (2002).
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Id. at 381.
244
Id.
245
Id. at 360 (discussing the employment question as “how to define the group of
workers that should enjoy certain protective regulations”).
246
ROBERTSON, supra note 7, at 50–54.
247
Id. at 52.
248
The example posed a request from a lead link to create an internal wiki for employees
to share best practices. However, the member does not have to accept the project and create the
wiki if the member believes the role would be best expressed through a blog or other means to
share best practices. The lead link cannot override the decision; at best, the link could reassign
the role or bring the role’s accountabilities to a governance meeting for more specific resolution.
Id. at 53–54.

2018

HOLACRACY AND THE LAW

41

responsibilities. In fact, holacracy seems to be a better fit for the definition
of a firm propounded in the “team production” model. In an important
response to Coase’s work, Armen Alchian and Harold Demsetz disagreed
with Coase’s focus on control, authority, and direction, and instead argued
that the firm coordinates production in the midst of a variety of inputs.249
Alchian and Demsetz defined team production as “production in which 1)
several types of resources are used and 2) the product is not a sum of
separable outputs of each cooperating resource.”250 As a result, team
production is used when the coordinated effort increases productivity,
after factoring out the costs associated with monitoring and disciplining
the team.251
Holacracy is premised on the idea of managing team production
through a constitutionalized structure. Rather than depending on the
direction and authority of individuals within a hierarchy, the contributors
to the team can rely on the underling structure to manage their
interrelationships. In their economic model, Alchian and Demsetz
proposed a specialized, independent monitor to ensure that the team
members all contribute appropriately and are rewarded appropriately.252
That central monitor—the recipient of the residual profits—would be the
firm. Under holacracy, the firm takes on a life of its own; its organizational
existence is the ongoing process through which team production is
managed.
Under a “team production” theory of the firm, there is little doubt
that the holacracy workers would be employees rather than independent
contractors. As I have argued previously, “[t]he critical insight is that
employment is defined not by control, but by participation—participation
in team production.”253 Control should not be necessary or sufficient to
the employment relationship. Instead, employees and equity contributors
have “cast their lots together to engage in economic activity that would
otherwise be extremely difficult to tease out into separate contracts.”254
Holacracy workers are more empowered than those within a traditional
hierarchy, but that does not mean they are not employees.255
249
Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic
Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 777 (1972).
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Id. at 779.
251
Id. at 780.
252
Id. at 782–83.
253
Matthew T. Bodie, Participation as a Theory of Employment, 89 NOTRE DAME L.
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Of course, holacracy’s changes to the employment relationship may
lead us to reexamine our legal construction of that relationship. If, as
Davidov argues, society’s regulations over employment are based in part
on “democratic deficits,” to what extent can we reconsider those
regulations in light of holacracy? As discussed subsequently in this Part,
holacracy may wreak changes on existing labor and employment laws.256
However, for the most part, employment regulations will apply to
employees whether they are under a holacratic system or a hierarchical.
Once the definition is met, the employee then receives the panoply of
common-law and statutory regulations, such as workplace safety,
minimum wages, overtime, pension and welfare benefits, unemployment
compensation, workplace accident compensation, and wrongful
discharge.257 If holacracy engenders a more empowered and engaged
workforce, can we ease back some of our current regulations and trust that
employees will grab these formerly-mandated terms for themselves, as
they desire?
In my view, a transition to holacracy by all of the nation’s
businesses would still not be enough to displace our current regime of
employment protections. Although holacracy does engender a more
distributed system of power within the organization, it does not necessarily
address the market power of lower skill workers within the overall
economy. The big question remaining on the table is what powers the
board and the lead link of the anchor circle retain over the allocation of
resources within the organization. Holacracy can extend to the board
level, and the board could be chosen by stakeholders, including current
employees.258 If employees have more organizational power at the highest
levels of the company, they will be able to better protect their interests
through governance as opposed to regulation.259 However, if the board is
a traditional shareholder-elected board, and the board has sole power over
the choice of lead link for the anchor circle, not much will have changed
in the superstructure of the company.260 Individual employees within the
company will have more organizational power over their jobs but that may
professionals exercise discretion in performing their work. Nonetheless, all employers retain a
right of control, however infrequently exercised.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §7.07
cmt. f (AM. LAW INST. 2006).
256
See infra Part IV.B & IV.C.
257
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258
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259
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260
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not translate to more power over issues such as wages, benefits, and
protections against employer opportunism.
However, holacratic firms may also try to take the employment
relationship into their own hands and rejigger it through private ordering.
Rather than seeking to push its workers further outside of the firm by
labeling them independent contractors, Holacracy One, LLC, has turned
all of its workers into members of its LLC.261 Under the operating
agreement, workers receive Class P membership units, which provide for
a guaranteed draw from the company.262 The Class P units can, under
certain restrictions, be exchanged for investor shares.263 Because they are
members of the LLC, the company does not consider the workers to be
employees.264 Holacracy shuns the employee label, at least in part,
because it sees the employment relationship as a “codependent parentchild dynamic,” rather than a “peer-to-peer relationship.”265
There are also, admittedly, regulatory benefits to taking away the
employment label and replacing it with a “partner” or “member” label. So,
can holacratic employers—pointing back at the “control” test—claim that
their workers are not employees? It is unclear if most companies—even
Holacracy One, LLC—can shed their employment label by providing
ownership interests to their workers. Under some statutory regimes,
owners of various stripes—partners, LLC members, shareholders—have
come within the statutory definition of “employee.”266 The Restatement
of Employment Law states that only those who “control all or part of the
enterprise” fall outside the definition of “employee” if they otherwise meet
the test.267 Following the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s
(“EEOC”) approach, the Supreme Court framed the issue, (for purposes
of the Americans with Disabilities Act) as “whether the individual acts
independently and participates in managing the organization, or whether
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the individual is subject to the organization’s control.”268 Under either of
these standards, holacracy members/partners would not be exempted from
the definition of employee. All holacratic workers are subject to the firm’s
control; that is, indeed, the very purpose of the holacracy constitution. The
constitution may free individual members to do their jobs without
intrusion from other workers, but ultimately no individual members—
outside, perhaps, the lead link of the anchor circle—have control over the
management of the firm. Thus, despite claims to the contrary, the
Holacracy One, LLC, members are likely employees, at least for most
employment-regulation purposes.269
Holacracy may challenge some of our assumptions about the
employment relationship, especially the primacy of “control” in defining
it. However, it would not make sense to change the definition of
employees to exclude holacracies and their workers, at least without
further reforms at the top of the pyramid. Holacracies better integrate
employees within the system and provide employees with greater voice
and control over their work life. The next step is to look at specific labor
and employment regulations and determine whether holacracy does,
and/or should, have an impact on that regulatory regime.
B. Labor-Management Relations
As discussed in Part IV.A, holacracy does not likely remove its
workers from the legal definition of “employees” under common law and
statutory regimes, even if they are provided with ownership interests. If
the workers are defined as “employees” under law, the statutory scheme
applies. However, the picture is complicated as to the application of labor
law. These difficulties flow from the central premise at the core of labor
law, which is that labor and management should bargain over the terms
and conditions of employment. The preamble to the National Labor
268
Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 449 (2003). The
Court endorsed the EEOC’s approach to this question, specifically in regard to its six factors for
determining control: “[1] Whether the organization can hire or fire the individual or set the rules
and regulations of the individual's work, [2] Whether and, if so, to what extent the organization
supervises the individual's work, [3] Whether the individual reports to someone higher in the
organization, [4] Whether and, if so, to what extent the individual is able to influence the
organization, [5] Whether the parties intended that the individual be an employee, as expressed
in written agreements or contracts, and [6] Whether the individual shares in the profits, losses,
and liabilities of the organization.” Id. at 449–50 (citing EEOC Compliance Manual §
605:0009).
269
For a discussion of the particular issue of LLC member as employees, see Daniel S.
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Employment Law, 22 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 477 (1997).
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Relations Act (“NLRA”) states that the Act is designed to resolve
workplace issues by “encouraging the practice and procedure of collective
bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of
association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their
own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of
their employment or other mutual aid or protection.”270 The NLRA puts
in place a structure whereby employees can elect a collective
representative for their bargaining unit, and that representative has the
power to demand that the employer bargain in good faith. Collective
bargaining is the engine of the labor law machine.
In order to have collective bargaining, you need at least two sides.
American labor law is premised on a dichotomy between labor and
management. On one side are the employees, and on the other side is the
employer. Under the common law definitions, the employees would be
everyone who works for the company, and the employer would simply be
a fictional business entity. But a fictional entity cannot negotiate. The
NLRA shifts the “management” employees from the employee side to the
employer side. Managers and supervisors represent the employer and are
excluded from the definition of “employee” under the Act. As Justice
Douglas explained in his dissent in Packard Motor Car Co. v. N.L.R.B.,271
which concerned whether foremen were within the definition of
“employee”:
[Failing to exclude supervisors and managers from NLRA
coverage] tends to obliterate the line between management
and labor. It lends the sanctions of federal law to unionization
at all levels of the industrial hierarchy. It tends to emphasize
that the basic opposing forces in industry are not management
and labor but the operating group on the one hand and the
stockholder and bondholder group on the other. The
industrial problem as so defined comes down to a contest over
a fair division of the gross receipts of industry between these
two groups.272
A struggle between shareholders and all employees, rather than between
management and labor, was not what the Act intended.273 Instead, workers
were meant to bargain with their entrepreneurial core of the company—
those who set the course of the firm and the firm’s relationship with its
employees.
270
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So even though there is no specific statutory exclusion for managers
under the Act, the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB” or “Board”)
and the Supreme Court have carved them out of the “employee” category.
Managerial employees are defined as “executive employees who are in a
position to formulate, determine and effectuate management policies.”274
The Board has also emphasized the need for managerial employees to
“have discretion in the performance of their jobs” independent of their
“employer’s established policy.”275 In some instances, employees who
execute important tasks and exercise discretion in those tasks have been
lumped in with management. Large-scale buyers, for example, are
managerial if they “are authorized to make substantial purchases for the
[e]mployer” and have substantial discretion in making such purchases.276
In N.L.R.B. v. Yeshiva University,277 the Supreme Court held that the
professors who participated in faculty governance were managerial
employees.278 Arguing that the Act was “intended to accommodate the
type of management-employee relations that prevail in the pyramidal
hierarchies of private industry,” the Court distinguished the operations of
“the typical ‘mature’ private university” as one based on notions of shared
authority.279 As the Court found:
[The faculty’s] authority in academic matters is absolute.
They decide what courses will be offered, when they will be
scheduled, and to whom they will be taught. They debate and
determine teaching methods, grading policies, and
matriculation standards. They effectively decide which
students will be admitted, retained, and graduated. On
occasion their views have determined the size of the student
body, the tuition to be charged, and the location of a school.
When one considers the function of a university, it is difficult
to imagine decisions more managerial than these.280

274
N.L.R.B. v. Bell Aerospace Co. Div. of Textron, Inc., 416 U.S. 267, 276 (1974)
(citing Ford Motor Co., 66 N.L.R.B. 1317, 1322 (1946)).
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Bell Aerospace Corp., 219 N.L.R.B. 384, 385 (1975).
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Am. Locomotive Co. (Dunkirk, N.Y.), 92 N.L.R.B. 115, 116–17 (1950). But see
Bell Aerospace Corp., 219 N.L.R.B. 384, 386 (1975) (“While it is true that the buyers are in a
position to commit the Employer's credit, the record reveals that the discretion and latitude for
independent action must take place within the confines of the general directions which the
Employer has established.”).
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444 U.S. 672 (1980).
278
Id. at 679.
279
Id. at 680.
280
Id. at 686.

2018

HOLACRACY AND THE LAW

47

It was irrelevant, said the Court, whether the professors exercised
independent judgment; the key was that the university used their collective
judgment in the process of its own governance.281 The Board has recently
refined its test to determine whether the faculty “actually exercise control
or make effective recommendations”282 over five types of decisions:
academic programs, enrollment management, finances, academic policies,
and personnel policies and decisions.283 Critical to this analysis is whether
the workers exercise “actual—rather than mere paper—authority.”284
Faculty members at one school were held to be non-managerial because
the faculty’s decisions on governance matters were frequently ignored or
reversed by the academic dean or the college’s president.285
Applying the managerial standard to holacracy, it seems that either
all employees or none of the employees would be considered managerial.
The design of holacracy is to provide significant discretion to workers in
making decisions within their authority. Although the lead link of a
particular circle assigns the roles for that circle, the worker holding the
role gets to determine how to express the purpose and achieve the
accountabilities of the role.286 In that sense, holacracy employees are
similar to large-scale buyers—they have the authority to make decisions
and the discretion to exercise that authority how they like. And as a
collective, holacracy workers have the authority to determine high-level
policy for the organization. Holacracy circles make decisions about the
creation, elimination, or amendment of roles and sub-circles.287 Circles
conduct governance meetings to resolve structural issues within the circle,
as well as tactical meetings to address operational concerns and actions.288
Circle membership consists of the roles within the circle, a lead link
appointed by the outside circle, and rep links from the circle’s sub-circles,
so that all workers involved in the circle participate in governance.289
Although the circle’s facilitator has important discretion within the
governance process, the facilitator’s role is to manage the process—not
281

See also Ithaca Coll., 261 N.L.R.B. 577, 578 (1982) (holding that the faculty were
managerial employees because of the way they “possessed and exercised” their authority);
LeMoyne-Owen Coll., 345 N.L.R.B. 1123, 1132 (2005) (holding that the faculty were
managerial employees because they exercised “substantial authority in a majority of critical
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dictate the outcome. The purpose of governance is to allow all circle
members to participate and to use the holacracy processes to arrive at a
group decision. Thus, if each circle exercises managerial authority in
setting policies as to its own domain, then all of the participants in that
circle are exercising managerial authority.
There are similar questions as to whom within a holacratic company
would be considered to be supervisors under the NLRA and thus excluded
from the definition of “employee.” The term supervisor is defined as any
individual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire,
transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or
discipline other employees, or responsibly to direct them” when “such
authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the use
of independent judgment.”290 Under this definition, it appears that lead
links would be considered supervisors. Although they lack many of the
traditional supervisory roles, such as firing or disciplining employees, they
do have the authority to assign roles within the circle.291 As the test for
supervisor is disjunctive, this authority is sufficient to fulfill one of the
twelve listed roles and thereby meet the definitional requirements.292
Although lead links can also take away someone’s role, this is not the same
as terminating them. Holacracy does not have set processes for hiring; the
organization is expected to develop these processes or choose a holacracy
“app” developed for the purpose.293 If these roles were to be defined as
circle governance prerogatives, it is possible that all circle members would
assume supervisory power.
The Board has yet to be faced with the question of holacratic
governance. Other self-management entities will face similar issues,
although perhaps more dramatically. At Buurtzorg, the teams of ten to
twelve nurses are almost entirely self-managed with very little exterior
input or oversight.294 At Morning Star, all employees have the power to
make purchasing decisions or even to initiate the hiring process.295 Faced
with these situations, the Board would essentially have three choices: (1)
apply the current doctrine broadly and find most or all employees to be
managerial; (2) apply the current doctrine narrowly and find none of the
290
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292
See SAMUEL ESTREICHER & MATTHEW T. BODIE, LABOR LAW 63 (Found. Press
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employees to be managerial; or (3) use the rough proportions of the current
doctrine to find some small group of employees to be managerial, such as
those who participate in the anchor circle. Something along the lines of
option (3) is perhaps most likely, if only to maintain the traditional notions
of labor-management relations, but options (1) or (2) would make more
sense, given the spirit behind the current doctrine.
If the Board did approve a unit of workers at a holacratic company
to select a collective bargaining representative, collective bargaining
would then endeavor to impose itself over the existing holacratic structure.
How would this work? Although there is significant overlap between the
two processes, there may be space for them to coexist without insoluble
conflict.
Collective bargaining concerns the terms and conditions of
employment for the employees of the bargaining unit.296 Although unions
can bring other issues to the table, only terms and conditions are
considered “mandatory” subjects of bargaining.297 Parties can insist on
bargaining to impasse over mandatory issues but not over permissive
ones.298 Neither party must accede to the other party’s efforts to bargain
over permissive terms.299 Moreover, employers must bargain over
changes to mandatory terms but need not bargain over permissive ones.300
There are other requirements to bargaining—parties must engage in the
process, share relevant information, and be willing to entertain proposals
from the other side.301 But the limitations on subject matter generally
channel bargaining into matters that concern employment.
Holacracy, on the other hand, is oriented towards the work of the
business rather than human resources issues. The taproot of holacracy is
the organizational purpose; all governance flows from that purpose.302
Roles and circles are created to serve the primary purpose but develop
individualized purposes of their own, along with domains and
accountabilities.303 Governance exists to manage the ongoing business
responsibilities—it is, in fact, a new management system.304 In contrast,
296
29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2012) (setting forth the obligation to bargain over “wages, hours,
and other terms and conditions of employment”).
297
N.L.R.B. v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958) (setting forth
the mandatory-permissive distinction).
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ESTREICHER & BODIE, supra note 292, at 134.
299
Id.
300
Id.
301
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Id. at 40–42, 46–49.
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holacracy seems at times uncomfortable with the issues surrounding
employment. Despite the intricacy of its system, it does not have a specific
process for hiring, firing, or determining compensation. And since one’s
employment relationship exists apart from one’s “roles,” there is even
more of a separation between holacracy governance and collective
bargaining.305
So perhaps collective bargaining could work within or alongside
a system of holacracy by serving as an “app” for employment-related
issues. Robertson describes a variety of “apps” that are available to
determine employee compensation under holacracy. For example, under
the Badge-based Compensation App, workers are awarded badges related
to particular roles and their service within those roles, and the badges are
then tied to compensation levels.306 If an employee has an issue with her
badge, she raises it as a “tension” at the appropriate governance meeting.307
The holacracy system is fairly ecumenical about compensation practices,
suggesting primarily that holacratic companies move away from the
traditional managerial prerogative over pay.308 Certainly, a collective
bargaining relationship would provide one possible system for negotiating
over terms on behalf of employees. The problem would be: with whom
would the union negotiate? As discussed above, in a holacratic system, it
is difficult to determine which employees are actual management. Perhaps
the best way to harmonize collective bargaining with holacracy would be
to have the union engage in initial bargaining with the anchor circle and
its representatives, and then negotiate for structures within holacracy that
could serve the employees’ interests while staying true to the holacratic
processes. Roles could be left to holacracy, but removing someone from
a role could be done through a holacracy-arbitration hybrid that would
provide the worker with union representation while allowing the
appropriate circle to make the final judgment. Obviously, there is much
more to consider. And there is, of course, the undeniable tension between
the two different systems of collective negotiation and dispute resolution.
They may be irreconcilable. But holacracy does leave some space for
grafted processes, especially when it comes to human resource issues.
One final labor law issue for holacracy to confront is whether
employers using holacracy are committing an unfair labor practice.
305
For one (fictional) depiction of being relieved of one’s roles without being fired, see
Silicon Valley: Fiduciary Duties (HBO television broadcast Apr. 27, 2014).
306
ROBERTSON, supra note 7, at 160–61.
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Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA prohibits employers from acting “to
dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor
organization or contribute financial or other support to it.”309 This
provision was originally intended to outlaw employer-based or company
unions, which sprung up to block legitimate unions from gaining a toehold.
However, the Board has extended the protections of Section 8(a)(2) to a
broader range of employer-related phenomena than simply company
unions. Finding a Section 8(a)(2) violation requires two analytical steps:
(1) determining whether the group, policy, or practice at issue is a “labor
organization,” and if so, (2) whether the employer has dominated,
interfered, or provided financial support to it. The Act defines a labor
organization as “any organization of any kind, or any agency or employee
representation committee or plan, in which employees participate and
which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers
concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of
employment, or conditions of work.”310
Consequently, a “labor
organization” need not be an independent organization at all; it can be a
subcommittee of workers within the employer itself or an employercreated plan of engagement. The only additional requirements are that
employees participate in some way and that the purpose of the
organization, committee, or plan is to deal with terms and conditions of
employment.
With the rise of quality management teams and other participatory
work models in the early 1990s, there was a wave of fear that these internal
structures were in violation of Section 8(a)(2).311 And in Electromation,
Inc.,312 the Board held that the employer’s “action committees,” which
were set up to provide interactions between workers and managers on
labor-related issues, were labor organizations that the employer
“dominated” and “supported” by the employer.313 The committees—
dealing with absenteeism, no-smoking policies, the communication
309

29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (2012).
29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (2012).
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network, pay progression for “premium” positions, and the attendance
bonus program—were to meet on a weekly basis during working hours to
develop proposals for management to consider.314 The employees on the
attendance bonus committee did, in fact, develop a policy, but the
management member of the committee rejected it as too costly; they then
developed a second policy, which was never presented to the president.315
Would holacracy governance circles similarly violate Section
8(a)(2)? Probably not. Holacracy is not a system that allows workers to
interact or “deal with” management—instead, holacracy replaces
management. The Board has held that employers may avoid the “dealing
with” prong of the labor-organization definition by delegating managerial
tasks completely to employees or employee groups. In Crown Cork &
Seal Co.,316 the employer utilized four production teams and three
administrative committees to manage a variety of workplace issues. The
teams had the authority to stop production lines, allocate training
assignments, and even administer the employee absentee program.317
Upper-level management did reserve some authority to review these
decisions, but it deferred to the teams in almost every case.318 Similarly,
the three administrative committees had their own bailiwicks of authority,
and they each made recommendations to the higher-ranked Management
Team on matters of plant discipline, certification raises, and plant
safety.319 The recommendations were rarely, if ever, not followed.
Because the teams and committees had authority “comparable to that of
the front-line supervisor,” the Board found that they were not labor
organizations.320 Holacracy circles have even more authority than the
teams in Crown Cork & Seal; delegated discretion is essentially
unreviewable, unless and until it is redelegated. By transferring power so
completely to the holacracy constitution and the power-sharing
governance processes it creates, holacratic companies should be able to
dodge any Section 8(a)(2) ramifications.
Thus, we end where we began—with the ramifications of holacracy
as a new system of management and governance. Because holacracy
endeavors to replace traditional management with a governance process,
it unsettles the standard paradigm for labor-management relations. While
314
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collective bargaining and holacracy could potentially coexist, the two
systems would need to amend their approaches in significant and, perhaps,
unsustainable ways. Holacracy endeavors to upend the traditional system
of hierarchical management which collective bargaining currently
assumes. A hybrid is possible—but it is unclear whether partisans from
either side would accede to such a hybrid.
C. Employee Fiduciary Duties
Do employees owe fiduciary duties to their employers? The law is
currently unsettled. Under traditional agency law, employees are agents
of their employers and owe an agent’s fiduciary duties of loyalty and
performance.321 However, a set of recent cases have held that employees
lower down in the organizational hierarchy do not owe fiduciary duties.322
The recent Restatement of Employment Law applies the fiduciary duty of
loyalty only to employees “in a position of trust and confidence.”323 Other
employees have only a limited duty of loyalty with respect to trade secrets
or a contractual duty of loyalty.324 The Restatement avers that: “As a
general matter, the duty of loyalty stated in this Section has little practical
application to the employer’s ‘rank-and-file’ employees . . . .”325
The policy dispute underlying this confusion concerns the relative
obligations that employees and employers owe to each other. Under a
traditional principal-agent relationship, the agent is charged with
321

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07(3)(a) (AM. LAW INST. 2006) (“[A]n
employee is an agent . . . .”); id. §§ 8.02–8.06 (duty of loyalty); id. §§ 8.07–8.12 (duty of
performance).
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2001) (holding that the circumstances regarding the employment relationship in question were
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responsibility on behalf of the principal and therefore must carry out this
responsibility appropriately.326 The fiduciary duties of loyalty and
performance ensure that the agent act with the principal’s best interests at
heart. Going back to its origins in master and servant law, the employment
relationship was a special subcategory of the agency relationship in which
the servant acted on behalf of the master, subject to the master’s control.327
The master-servant relationship made the master liable for the servant’s
actions under respondeat superior, but it also had the effect of making the
servant responsible to the master as a fiduciary.328 Because the servant
could bind the master and was often charged with managing the master’s
property or affairs, the servant had to act in the interests of the master.
From the perspective of agency theory, employees clearly have
discretion over their employer’s property and business interests and must
therefore have responsibility to use those assets in a way that benefits the
employer. However, when taking a more modern view to the employment
relationship, the employee’s vulnerabilities are highlighted. Employees
work under a default rule of employment at-will, meaning the employer
can fire them at any time.329 Notions of lifetime employment and
corporate loyalty to employees are much less common amongst
employers.330 Many commentators now feel it would be dangerously onesided to enrobe employees with fiduciary responsibilities when employers
can drop them on a moment’s notice.331
The theory behind employee fiduciary duties has always rested on
something of a conundrum. The common-law definition of employment
centers on the employer’s right to physical control over the employee’s
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work.332 The employee is thus almost an instrumentality of the
employer—an extension of the employer’s will. At the same time, the
primary theoretical justification for fiduciary duties is the exercise of
discretion.333 Because a fiduciary has discretion in the completion of tasks
that inure to the good of the beneficiary, fiduciary duties are necessary to
cabin and channel the fiduciary’s actions. If an employee is controlled and
has little discretion over her tasks, then there is little reason for fiduciary
duties to come into play.
Holacracy, however, reintroduces discretion into the life of the
employee. Each role has a specific domain over which that role has near
absolute authority.334 But the individual role-filler exercises that
discretion for the good of the whole. As such, each role carries with it a
responsibility to serve the organization and its ultimate purpose.335 This
responsibility looks much like the fiduciary expectations placed on an
agent. Similarly, workers participate in larger circles that govern the
broader policies of the organization.336 These circles have their own
domains and accountabilities but ultimately exist to serve the
organization’s purpose. The participants of the circle have a responsibility
to the whole.337
It may seem inapposite to invoke fiduciary duties in these
particularized contexts of roles and circles within holacracy. But workers
332
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1958) (“[A]n agent
employed by a master to perform service in his affairs whose physical conduct in the
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employee as “an agent whose principal controls or has the right to control the manner and means
of the agent’s performance of work”).
333
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in a holacratic firm participate in the life of the organization in a way that
workers in a hierarchical firm do not. In some ways, holacratic workers
are more akin to partners than employees; partners owe reciprocal
fiduciary duties to the partnership as a separate entity as well as to their
fellow partners in the aggregate.338 Creating duties of performance and
loyalty for holacracy participants may smooth some of the bumps that are
created by the pockets of discretion within the organization.339
There is a catch, though. Fiduciary duties are imposed upon
contracting parties and add to, if not override, the underlying agreement.
But the Holacracy Constitution is a system of governance that endeavors
to provide a comprehensive approach for firm governance. Holacratic
firms may prefer to resolve employee duties through internal processes,
rather than resorting to judicially enforced duties. For example, if a
worker is potentially breaching her duty of loyalty by working at another
firm, the company may prefer to handle it as a “tension” that is resolved
through a circle governance meeting.340 Resorting to the courts may be
characterized as opting out of the game and relying on outsiders to take
care of internal affairs. Perhaps that is why Holacracy One, LLC,
disclaims all fiduciary duties outside of the duty of good faith for its
managers.341 But this disclaimer reinforces the idea of holacracy itself as
an agreement—a governance agreement between the participants in the
firm.
D. Holacracy as Employment Contract
The use of a constitution is essential to the holacracy system. The
first step in transitioning to holacracy is adopting the Holacracy
Constitution.342 Ratifying the constitution is not framed as a run-of-themill employer human resources decision; rather, the choice is intended to
be formal and binding. The company must choose to place its managerial
authority within the governance structure created within the
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that the Managers may have to the Members shall be limited and eliminated to the fullest extent
permitted by applicable law, except that the Managers shall have the fiduciary duties of good
faith and fair dealing in any relationship with such Members.”).
342
ROBERTSON, supra note 7, at 151.
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Constitution.343 The decision must be transparent and the Constitution
must be signed, published, and made available to all involved.344 Only
then is the Constitution binding. The shift from a hierarchy of people to a
constitution of roles and processes is the critical move.345 The powers that
were individually held by the CEO, officers, managers, supervisors, and
individual employees are now transferred to the holacratic structure. The
“Adoption Declaration” found in the prototype Holacracy Constitution
requires the ratifiers to sign under the declaration in which they “adopt the
Holacracy Constitution” and “thereby cede their authority into the
Constitution’s processes.”346 And Section 5.1 of the Constitution similarly
provides that the ratifiers “cede their authority to govern and run the
Organization or direct its Partners, and may no longer do so except through
the authority granted to them under the Constitution’s rules and
processes.”347
Although the Constitution is intended to bind the organization, it is
unclear to what extent the organization is legally bound. In terms of
changing the Constitution or terminating it, Section 5.5 provides that the
ratifiers may amend the Constitution or repeal it entirely “using whatever
authority and process they relied on to adopt it.”348 The only requirement
appears to be notification: the changes must be in writing and published in
a way that is accessible to all of those in the organization. This process
does allow the ratifiers a way out if they regret the transition to
holacracy.349 Robertson stresses, however, that the Constitution is binding
as long as it is in effect.350 If it has not been terminated through the
appropriate process, it remains controlling.
But if we assume that the Constitution has been adopted by
company representatives and remains in force, we must confront the
question of whether it is legally enforceable.
If the company
representatives disregard the processes or follow them improperly, the
343

Id. (“In order to adopt Holacracy as a new power structure for your organization (or
team/department), you must first have whoever formally holds power clearly cede that power to
Holacracy’s ‘rules of the game.’”).
344
Id. at 152 (“Everyone needs to know that the current power holder has formally ceded
power.”).
345
Id. at 146 (“Either a manager declares what rules or processes will be used, or
managers are bound by the constitution and no longer have the authority to make such
declarations.”).
346
HOLACRACY CONST., Const. Adoption Declaration.
347
HOLACRACY CONST., art. V, § 1.
348
Id. § 5.
349
If the ratifiers choose a complicated process for ratification—for example, a majority
vote amongst employees—then they may not be able to escape holacracy so easily.
350
ROBERTSON, supra note 7, at 152 (“[The CEO] can retain the right to ‘unadopt’
Holacracy at any point and go back to the old way of running things, but not to override specific
constitutional rules in the meantime.”).
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Holacracy Constitution itself has mechanisms for challenging the
actions.351 These are clearly holacracy’s preferred avenues for dispute
resolution. But if these holacratic processes break down and the
constitutional breach remains unaddressed, a participant may seek legal
enforcement of the constitutional provisions. Such a legal action would
make particular sense when a worker has suffered a loss of role, a
demotion, a loss in pay, or termination. In such instances, the
constitutional violation has not merely broken an internal role but has also
led to concrete and cognizable injury.
The Holacracy Constitution looks a lot like other types of employer
policies or documents that provide a roadmap to the firm’s internal
governance. The employment relationship, though contractual, is often
informally created with no specific written contract to control its terms.
The basics of compensation and job responsibilities will likely be
hammered out, but peripheral matters are many times left open. In the
midst of this uncertainty, courts have developed certain default rules like
employment at-will to manage the contractual terms.352 In addition,
employers may provide guidance through employee manuals, handbooks,
policy statements, or other internal distributions that purport to explain or
provide for certain aspects of the employment relationship. These
employer distributions provide guidance to managers, supervisors, and
employees about the firm’s structure and the policies that guide its inner
workings.353
Employees have primarily turned to these manuals or other policy
statements to enforce procedural safeguards against adverse employment
actions, particularly termination. Prior to the 1980s, courts generally
ignored employer statements about employment terms made outside the
context of a written contract.354 However, courts eventually began to take
351

The Constitution gives primary responsibility to a circle’s secretary for interpreting
the Constitution with respect to circle matters. HOLACRACY CONST., art. III, § 4. When a circle
nevertheless continues with actions that conflict with the constitutional rules, the Constitution
provides that the outer circle (or super-circle) must take action to resolve the violation. Id. § 5.
352
Employment at-will is more than just a default rule; it has turned into something of
a sticky default. See Omri Ben-Shahar & John A. E. Pottow, On the Stickiness of Default Rules,
33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 651, 677 (2006) (finding the at-will rule to be “highly sticky” as a
default).
353
Jennifer L. McClain, Ten Reasons Every Employer Should Have an Employee
Handbook, 52 ORANGE COUNTY LAW. 10, 10 (2010) (“An employee handbook is a set of
written policies that can be a powerful tool for businesses. The handbook sets out all the policies
that a company uses in the regular course of business, explains company programs, and
communicates general information.”).
354
MARK A. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW § 9.3, at 729 (5th ed. 2015)
(“Before the 1980s, courts generally held that promises and statements made by employers in
employment handbooks and manuals did not give rise to any contractual obligations.”); J.H.
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these statements seriously and treat them as legally enforceable. In one
line of cases, courts held that employers had created a unilateral contract
with employees by distributing the manual and treating it as binding
company policy.355 In another line of cases, courts focused on the
employer’s creation of reasonable expectations as justification for
enforcement.356 Although the routes to enforcement differ, it is settled law
that handbooks, manuals, and other policy statements can create
obligations that are binding on employers.357 The critical issue is whether
the employer has evinced an intent to be bound by the policy statement in
question.358 Such intent may be gleaned in part from a broad distribution
of the statement to employees as well as the lack of formal, written
employment contracts.359 But courts have generally treated such
statements as non-binding when the employer includes a clear disclaimer

Verkerke, The Story of Woolley v. Hoffman-La Roche: Finding a Way to Enforce Employer
Handbook Promises, in EMPLOYMENT LAW STORIES 23, 27 (Samuel Estreicher & Gillian Lester
eds., 2007) (“If you could travel back in time to the early 1970s, it would seem very odd, perhaps
even preposterous, for an employment lawyer to believe that statements in a company’s
employee handbook or personnel policy manual concerning job security would be legally
enforceable.”).
355
See, e.g., Woolley v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257, 1267 (N.J. 1985)
(holding that “the manual is an offer that seeks the formation of a unilateral contract—with the
employees’ bargained-for action needed to make the offer binding being their continued work
when they have no obligation to continue”); Asmus v. Pac. Bell, 999 P.2d 71, 77 (Cal. 2000);
Continental Air Lines, Inc. v. Keenan, 731 P.2d 708 (Colo. 1987).
356
See, e.g., Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 292 N.W.2d 880, 892
(Mich. 1980) (holding that “employer statements of policy . . . can give rise to contractual rights
in employees without evidence that the parties mutually agreed that the policy statements would
create contractual rights in the employee”); Bankey v. Storer Broad. Co., 443 N.W.2d 112, 119
(Mich. 1989) (“[Written policies] are not enforceable because they have been ‘offered and
accepted’ as a unilateral contract; rather, their enforceability arises from the benefit the employer
derives by establishing such policies.”); Drobny v. Boeing Co., 907 P.2d 299, 302 (1995) (“This
rule rests on the principle that by using a manual or handbook, an employer secures promises
from the employees which create a loyal, orderly and cooperative work force, such that the
employer should be equally bound to its promises to the employee which are designed to create
an atmosphere of job security and fair treatment.”).
357
RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2.05 (AM. LAW INST. 2015) (“Policy
statements by an employer in documents such as employee manuals, personnel handbooks, and
employment policy directives that are provided or made accessible to employees, whether by
physical or electronic means, and that, reasonably read in context, establish limits on the
employer's power to terminate the employment relationship, are binding on the employer until
modified or revoked . . . .”); id. § 2.05 Reporters’ Notes to cmt. a (noting the “position of the
clear majority of U.S. jurisdictions . . . that unilateral employer policy statements can, in
appropriate circumstances, establish binding employer obligations”).
358
SAMUEL ESTREICHER & GILLIAN LESTER, EMPLOYMENT LAW 50 (Found. Press
2008) (“It is often a question for the trier of fact whether a particular unilateral employer
statement, or set of such statements, reasonably read in context, was intended to bind the
employer.”).
359
Id.
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that the statement has no legal or contractual effect.360 Although the
disclaimer may be washed out in the face of demonstrated employer
signaling to the contrary,361 it is generally held to be strong evidence that
the employer did not intend to be bound.362
In contemporary cases, disputes over employer policy statements
generally come down to the power of the disclaimer versus the
surrounding context. However, there is no disclaimer in the Holacracy
Constitution. In fact, the Constitution takes pains to establish that it is, in
fact, binding upon the organization as long as it remains in effect.363 Given
the weight that holacracy places upon the Constitution’s binding nature, it
would be almost oxymoronic to claim that the Constitution was not
intended to bind the company. All signals are to the contrary. As such,
the Constitution would easily meet the requirements that it was “provided
or made accessible” and that it “establish[ed] limits on the employer’s
power.”364
Of course, the Holacracy Constitution does not itself proscribe
employment at-will, nor does it provide a specific approach to employee
termination, demotion, or reduction in pay. Instead, the Constitution
provides a governance process whereby procedures for issues like
performance evaluations and compensation are themselves developed
through the system of roles, circles, and governance meetings.365 In order
to bring a suit under the Constitution, the employee would need to
establish that the governance system was not followed, and, as a result of
that breach, he was terminated without the proper process. It may be that
the process established through holacracy was not followed;366 or, on a
360
Id. (“All jurisdictions give considerable weight to the presence of a prominent
disclaimer.”); Verkerke, supra note 354, at 24 (“By indicating clearly that the handbook was not
intended to have contractual effect . . . , employers could opt out of these newly discovered
contractual obligations and thus restore the long-standing rule of employment at will.”).
361
RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2.05 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2015) (“Any
such disclaimer should be viewed, of course, in the context of the entire statement, other
employer policies, and the employer's course of conduct.”).
362
Id. § 2.05 Reporters’ Notes to cmt. c (“All jurisdictions give considerable weight to
the presence of a prominent disclaimer in the employer statement as evidence that the statement
is not a binding commitment.”).
363
HOLACRACY CONST., art. V, § 1 (providing that the ratifiers “cede their authority to
govern and run the Organization or direct its Partners, and may no longer do so except through
the authority granted to them under the Constitution’s rules and processes”).
364
RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2.05 (AM. LAW INST. 2015).
365
ROBERTSON, supra note 7, at 158 (“[T]he Holacracy constitution gives you an
underlying platform, or a meta-process—a set of core rules for defining, evolving, and enacting
your business processes over time.”).
366
As an example, assume that a company follows the holacracy governance process to
establish a two-warning discharge system, but the employee is fired without two warnings.
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more meta-level, that the Constitution was not followed in setting up a
process, even if that process was properly followed in the instant case.367
In either case, the sanctity of the underlying process was not respected,
and as a result the employee can claim that the adverse employment action
was a breach of contract. Moreover, the workers in these situations will
have the advantage of judges who come steeped in an understanding of
constitutional process. By framing the Holacracy Constitution as a
constitution, holacracy gives its internal structure an even stronger sense
of legality and a metaphor upon which to build.
If a company was looking to avoid this result while still adhering to
the principles of holacracy, it could emphasize that holacracy was an
internal governance structure that was meant to be enforced internally.
The Constitution has an internal dispute resolution system to deal with
conflicts between parties, including conflicts over whether the
constitutional rules are being followed.368 When adopted by a company,
the Constitution could include language that the rights created under the
document only extend to the enforcement provisions created within and
do not comprehend legal enforcement. Alternatively, the Constitution
could provide for arbitration of all disputes relating to the Constitution,
after any internal processes are exhausted. The Holacracy One Operating
Agreement provides that disputes under the Operating Agreement are to
be resolved through a process of negotiation, mediation, and ultimately
final and binding arbitration under the rules of the American Arbitration
Association.369 Given the complexity of the holacracy process, an
arbitrator trained in holacracy may in fact provide better dispute resolution
than a judge or jury confronted with “lead links” and “sub-circles.”
However, employees may feel that the rights granted through the
Constitution are undermined when only enforceable through arbitration.
V. HOLACRACY AND FIRM LIABILITY
Firms are generally liable for the actions of their representatives.
The idea of responsibility for the actions of another derives from English
master/servant law, in which the master was liable for the tortious actions
of her servant if such actions were undertaken as part of the servant’s
role.370 The modern doctrine holds an employer liable for the acts of its
367

As an example, assume that the employer set up a two-warning discharge system and
the employee was given two warnings, but the two-warning system itself was set up by a lead
link who did not follow the appropriate governance processes under the Constitution in setting
up the system.
368
HOLACRACY CONST., art. III, §§ 4, 5.
369
Holacracy One Operating Agreement, supra note 32, § 17.8, at 37.
370
1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *417 (1765).
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employees committed within the scope of employment.371 Although many
different justifications for the doctrine have been given, most justifications
center around the responsibility for, or control of, the employer over the
employee.372 When the employer has directed the employee to perform a
certain act, the responsibility is clear.373 However, even when the
employer has not directly ordered the particular action, it is still liable for
actions taken when the employee is acting as an employee and on behalf
of the employer. This form of vicarious liability is justified on the grounds
that the employer should be responsible for its actions as an
organization.374 The organization “caused” the tort and thus must face the
liability attendant to that action.375 Respondeat superior also provides
incentives for employers to monitor the acts of their employees and shifts
the risk of individual tortfeasor insolvency from the victim to an
organization entity that benefits from the actions of the tortfeasor
generally.376 Despite the somewhat fictionalized sense of “blame” placed
371
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.04 (AM. LAW INST. 2006) (“An employer
is subject to liability for torts committed by employees while acting within the scope of their
employment.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 409 (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (“Except as
stated in §§ 410–429, the employer of an independent contractor is not liable for physical harm
caused to another by an act or omission of the contractor or his servants.”).
372
W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 69, at
499–501 (5th ed. 1984). Employers can also be liable for the torts of independent contractors,
but generally only under one of three conditions: (1) the employer is negligent in “selecting,
instructing, or supervising the contractor;” (2) the employer has a nondelegable duty of care to
the public as a whole or the particular plaintiff; or (3) the work done by the contractor for the
employer is “specially” or “inherently” dangerous. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 409
cmt. b.
373
Harold J. Laski, The Basis of Vicarious Liability, 26 YALE L.J. 105, 105 (1916) (“If
a master choose to give orders to his servant, no one can fail to understand why he should be
held liable for the consequences of their commission.”).
374
ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 186 (1995) (arguing that vicarious
liability “construes (indeed constructs) the doer as a composite: the-employer-acting-throughthe-employee”); Alan O. Sykes, The Boundaries of Vicarious Liability: An Economic Analysis
of the Scope of Employment Rule and Related Legal Doctrines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 563, 565
(1988) (“In most cases in which an employee commits a tort during the ordinary course of duties,
no question arises as to whether the employee acted within the scope of employment. The
wrongful conduct is plainly a consequence of the employment relationship and represents the
materialization of a risk that is normally attendant upon such employment relationships.”).
375
Id. at 609 (“The scope of employment limitation upon respondeat superior liability
may be understood in many instances as a way to limit the employer's liability to torts that are
‘caused’ by the business enterprise.”) (emphasis added); see also Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v.
United States, 398 F.2d 167, 171 (2d Cir. 1968) (finding a “deeply rooted sentiment that business
enterprise cannot justly disclaim responsibility for accidents which may fairly be said to be
characteristic of its activities”).
376
Alan O. Sykes, The Economics of Vicarious Liability, 93 YALE L.J. 1231, 1241–42
(1984) (emphasizing insolvency); see also Gary T. Schwartz, The Hidden and Fundamental
Issue of Employer Vicarious Liability, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1739, 1763–64 (1996) (providing a
deterrence-based argument for vicarious liability).
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on the entity, vicarious liability is settled law, widely supported by
scholars of all stripes.377
Organizational criminal liability, on the other hand, is much less
common and less established as a matter of theory. As a matter of basic
doctrine, business organizations may be held criminally responsible for
the misdeeds of their employees along the same lines as respondeat
superior.378 In order to satisfy the mens rea requirement, courts have
additionally required that the employee have acted with the intent to
benefit the business entity.379 This basic and broad approach has become
“firmly entrenched as, more or less, the across-the-board rule of enterprise
liability for all manner of crimes.”380 However, courts—and particularly
prosecutors—have in practice adopted a narrower standard of liability
centering around the role of management in the crime. This practice is
reflected in the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code (“MPC”),
which finds a corporation to be criminally liable if the criminal conduct
was “authorized, requested, commanded, performed or recklessly
tolerated by the board of directors or by a high managerial agent acting in
behalf of the corporation within the scope of his office or employment.”381
The United States Department of Justice, in a series of memoranda setting
377
Schwartz, supra note 376, at 1767 (“Within the United States the current consensus
in favor of vicarious liability (among both scholars and interest groups) is so broad as to make
vicarious liability almost a nonissue.”). For discussions of extending vicarious liability to
controlling shareholders, see Nina A. Mendelson, A Control-Based Approach to Shareholder
Liability for Corporate Torts, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1203, 1247–50 (2002). For an argument for
extending liability to corporate officers, see Timothy P. Glynn, Beyond “Unlimiting”
Shareholder Liability: Vicarious Tort Liability for Corporate Officers, 57 VAND. L. REV. 329,
396–98 (2004).
378
See N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 495 (1909).
379
See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 307 F.2d 120, 128 (5th Cir. 1962)
(describing the requirements as elements of liability taken from civil tort law); see also Samuel
W. Buell, Criminal Procedure Within the Firm, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1613, 1662 (2007) (“Under
current law, a firm faces criminal liability for virtually any criminal act by an agent. The standard
is respondeat superior: the master is liable if the agent acted within the scope of employment
and at least in part to benefit the master. In practice, this standard amounts to strict vicarious
liability because almost any act on the job is ‘within the scope of employment’ and because
courts have all but read the ‘intent to benefit’ element out of the law.”) (citing 1 KATHLEEN F.
BRICKEY, CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY §§ 3:01–:11, at 89-145 (2d ed. 1992)) (emphasis
added).
380
Samuel W. Buell, The Blaming Function of Entity Criminal Liability, 81 IND. L.J.
473, 475–76 (2006); see also Jennifer Arlen, The Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate
Criminal Liability, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 833, 836–37 (1994) (stating that the existing legal regime
closely approximates a rule of “pure strict vicarious liability”).
381
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(1)(c) (AM. LAW INST. Proposed Official Draft 1962);
see also Pamela H. Bucy, Corporate Ethos: A Standard for Imposing Corporate Criminal
Liability, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1095, 1103 (1991) (“This standard still uses a respondeat superior
model, but in a limited fashion: the corporation will be liable for conduct of only some agents
(its directors, officers, or other higher echelon employees).”) (emphasis added).
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forth the standards for when corporations should be charged with
crimes,382 has consistently required more than mere respondeat superior
liability.383 And in assigning appropriate punishment for corporate crimes,
the United States Sentencing Guidelines (“Sentencing Guidelines”)
assessed punishment for corporate guilt based on whether “an individual
within high-level personnel of the unit participated in, condoned, or was
willfully ignorant of the offense; or tolerance of the offense by substantial
authority personnel was pervasive throughout such [entity].”384
Commentators have noted a change from vicarious liability to more of a
negligence standard as to corporate management’s role in overseeing
internal investigations.385
A move to holacracy will change the traditional calculus for civil
and criminal liability. The change will be less significant on the civil side
where respondeat superior broadly sweeps most employee activity into
the “scope of employment.” The holacracy system of roles and domains,
rather than positions, may allow companies to make stronger claims that
the employee was acting outside the scope, since the roles more
specifically define the type of activities expected, and domains more
specifically set forth the zone of responsibility.386 Respondeat superior
rests on the notion that the employer has designated the employee as its
382
See Memorandum from Deputy Attorney Gen. Sally Q. Yates on Individual
Accountability for Corporate Wrongdoing to the Assistant Attorney Gen. 4 (Sept. 9, 2015),
available at https://www.justice.gov/archives/dag/file/769036/download; Memorandum from
Deputy Attorney Gen. Mark R. Filip on Principles of Fed. Prosecution of Bus. Orgs. 4 (Aug. 28,
2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/corp-charging-guidelines.pdf;
Memorandum from Deputy Attorney Gen. Paul J. McNulty on Principles of Fed. Prosecution of
Bus. Orgs. to Heads of Dep't Components 4 (Dec. 12, 2006), available at
http://www.justice.gov/dag/speeches/2006/mcnulty_memo.pdf; Memorandum from Deputy
Attorney Gen. Larry D. Thompson on Principles of Fed. Prosecution of Bus. Orgs. to Heads of
Dep't Components (Jan. 20, 2003) https://tinyurl.com/y9f7mtrm [hereinafter Thompson
Memorandum].
383
Some of the factors in determining when to charge a corporation within the
Thompson Memorandum include: “the nature and seriousness of the offense,” “the
pervasiveness of wrongdoing within the corporation,” “the corporation’s history of similar
conduct,” and “the adequacy of civil or regulatory enforcement.” Thompson Memorandum,
supra note 382, at 3.
384
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5(b)(1)(A) (U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N 2012).
385
See, e.g., Kimberly D. Krawiec, Organizational Misconduct: Beyond the PrincipalAgent Model, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 571, 572 (2005) ("[A]t least since the adoption of the
Organizational Sentencing Guidelines (OSG) in 1991, the U.S. legal regime has been moving
away from a system of strict vicarious liability toward a system of duty-based organizational
liability.").
386
ROBERTSON, supra note 7, at 42 (discussing roles within holacracy); id. at 44 (“A
domain (of which there may be several) specifies something the role has the exclusive authority
to control on behalf of the organization—in other words, this role’s ‘property.’”).
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representative with regard to actions undertaken through employment; as
in principal-agent law, the principal-employer has given the agentemployee the authority to act on its behalf.387 Holacracy sharpens the
delegation between employer and employee, requiring (in theory) more
specific instructions to the employee.388 It should thus be easier for a
holacratic company to show that an employee was acting outside of the
scope of her authority. However, courts have largely blurred the scope of
the employment doctrine, generally finding the employer liable if the
employee’s action was job-related.389 If the employee is acting outside of
her domain but more generally in service to the employer, it is unlikely
that a court would allow the employer to escape from vicarious liability.
When it comes to criminal liability, however, holacracy’s change to
the traditional management structure unsettles the trend in corporate
criminal law. Most companies use a hierarchical management structure to
run the company, and prosecutors and courts look to managerial
involvement to determine enterprise responsibility. For example, the
Model Penal Code requires the participation of “high managerial agents”
to find liability; such agents are defined as those with “duties of such
responsibility that [their] conduct may fairly be assumed to represent the
policy of the corporation or association.”390 Similarly, the Sentencing
Guidelines look to whether “an individual within high-level personnel of
the unit participated in, condoned, or was willfully ignorant of the
offense.”391 In a traditionally-managed firm, this focus on the upper
reaches of the hierarchy makes some sense, as these actors makes the
broader policy decisions and may be more responsible for the
organization’s culture.
Holacracy, however, eschews the hierarchical organization chart
and instead installs a constitutional structure. Circles create governance
policies, and roles carry out their accountabilities. Management is
conducted through the structure and not through individuals.392 As a
result, it will be difficult or nonsensical to assign organizational blame
based purely on hierarchical culpability. On the other hand, it will be
387
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2006) (“An agent acts
with actual authority when, at the time of taking action that has legal consequences for the
principal, the agent reasonably believes, in accordance with the principal's manifestations to the
agent, that the principal wishes the agent so to act.”).
388
ROBERTSON, supra note 7, at 42 (“The Holacracy governance process generates
clarity by defining explicit roles with explicit accountabilities, which grant explicit authority,
and then continuously evolves these definitions to integrate . . . .”).
389
See Sykes, supra note 374, at 586–87, 609 (discussing the broad contours of
employer liability, especially in “frolic and detour” cases).
390
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(4)(c) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
391
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5(b)(1)(A) (U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N, 2012).
392
ROBERTSON, supra note 7, at 34–59.
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easier to blame the corporation if the wrongdoer was acting within her role
and domain on behalf of the company. Holacracy empowers individual
workers by assigning them roles, domains, and accountabilities directly
from the organization’s constitutional governance structure. The worker
was not installed in her position by a supervisor; she was instead assigned
a role within a circle and asked to manage the accountabilities of that role
within the role’s domain. It is thus easier to blame the organization as a
whole, rather than the individual, if the individual committed the crime
within her role. The firm is more directly accountable.
The holacracy approach also helps to resolve an ongoing tension
within enterprise criminal liability over the tension between direct
responsibility and overall authority. As existing practice makes clear, we
are more likely to assign blame to the organization as a whole if the
organization’s leadership is involved in the crime. On the other hand,
many instances of corporate crime involve the activities of those who are
lower within the hierarchy. In the British Petroleum (“BP”) Deepwater
Horizon disaster, lower-level employees made the mistakes that led to the
disastrous spill, and some of those most directly responsible died in the
explosion.393 At the same time, BP leadership was feckless and
unprepared to deal with the accident’s consequences. There is thus a
dilemma over responsibility. As Samuel Buell explains it:
The trouble with blaming the managers and executives is that,
as in many cases of corporate crime, it’s difficult to pinpoint
who within the massive, bureaucratic global organization that
is BP both knew enough and was in charge enough to be the
right target for blame. This isn’t just a lawyer’s problem, a
mere difficulty of proof. It’s a problem of responsibility and
culpability. The higher you go in BP, the more responsible
the managers seem to be—but the less they knew and were
involved day-to-day in the Deepwater Horizon rig.394
Under holacracy, on-site employees need not wait for directions from faraway management, nor is management expected to be omniscient about
its many jobsites. Instead, responsibility is handed over to the structure
and devolved to those more directly involved in the task. Holacracy
mitigates the tension between responsibility and authority; the “lowerlevel” employee has more authority over the task and is thus more
responsible for the outcome. That might make the employee look more
393
SAMUEL W. BUELL, CAPITAL OFFENSES: BUSINESS CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN
AMERICA’S CORPORATE AGE 110 (2016).
394
Id. at 111.
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individually responsible for the decision. But since the employee is
empowered under holacracy, and the firm itself has adopted holacracy for
its management system, it seems fairer to blame the corporation as a
whole.
That does not necessarily mean that holacratic firms will be more
vulnerable to criminal liability. As suggested earlier, individuals acting
outside of their roles and domains will look more like individual “rogue”
agents than they would with a less defined set of responsibilities.
Moreover, there is evidence that workers are less likely to commit crimes
if they feel that workplace policies are legitimate and follow procedurally
just rules.395 Although deterrence and incentives play a role in compliance,
studies have found that employees are more likely to follow internal and
external rules if they believe in the legitimacy of workplace authority.396
Holacracy fosters that sense of legitimacy by creating participatory
processes that depend on the workings of an agreed-upon set of rules,
rather than managerial fiat.397
We recognize that organizations, such as corporations, can be held
blameworthy for acts that are committed by individuals acting within
them.398 Holacracy helps make sense of this liability by moving away
from a hierarchy-based theory of blame and focusing on a true sense of
entity-oriented responsibility. However, prosecutors and courts would
need to move away from their notions of managerial responsibility to adapt
to the new reality.
CONCLUSION
The law takes the economic firm and places its participants into
familiar categories: corporations, directors, CEOs, officers, and
employees. Holacracy unsettles those categories. It challenges our ideas
of internal firm governance, strips management of its traditional powers,
and recasts workers from controlled subjects to participating players.
Although holacracy is only one example from the palette of participatory
395

Tom R. Tyler, Reducing Corporate Criminality: The Role of Values, 51 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 267, 267 (2014) (arguing that “legitimacy is important for internal regulation, as
businesses with ethical cultures that are legitimate to employees are less likely to engage in
wrongdoing”).
396
Id. at 277 (“Research suggests that certain values, such as legitimacy, can motivate
self-regulatory behavior in organizational settings.”). For an example of one such study, see
TOM R. TYLER & STEVEN L. BLADER, COOPERATION IN GROUPS 190–92 (2000).
397
TYLER & BLADER, supra note 396, at 198 (“Many new management techniques have
. . . made strides toward including employees directly in the process, increasing the respect
shown to employees, and empowering those employees.”).
398
BUELL, supra note 393, at 115 (“Organizations cause bad things to happen . . . .
When we organize ourselves into groups for even the noblest purposes, we can’t help but
produce some ill effects.”).

68

DELAWARE JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW

VOL. 42

governance approaches, its fully-imagined scope and detail provide an
ideal subject for testing the impact of the latest participatory governance
thinking on existing legal doctrines. The results? The law can adapt to
holacracy and its relations, but it will require a willingness from courts,
companies, attorneys, and academics to understand these new systems and
move beyond our existing answers.

***

